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Environmental Justice and Title VI: 
Making Recipient Agencies Justify 
Their Siting Decisions 
Bradford C. Mank* 
ntle VI prohibits federal agencies from providing fonds to state or local agencies that 
discriminate. Environmental justice advocates have filed over fzfty ntle VI complaints with the 
EPA alleging that state or local environmental agencies have granted permits that will cause 
disparate impacts against minority groups. In February 1998, the EPA promulgated an Interim 
Guidance on ntle VI to help the agency resolve these complaints. A wide range of state and 
local offiCials has criticized the Guidance because its vague definition of "disparate impact" 
may give the EPA too much discretion to find discrimination. This Article demonstrates, 
however, that the Guidance fails to provide sufficient protection far minority groups. First, EPA 
should place the burden on recipient agencies to demonstrate that no less disCriminatory 
alternative exists that is comparably effective. Second, the recipient agency and permittee 
should have the burden of showing that any proposed mitigation measures will be effective. 
Third, the EPA or recipients should oifor technical assistance, including grants, to community 
groups and complainants. Finally, EPA should encourage states to adopt procedures to 
promote early and effective participation by minority and other groups to avoid controversies 
that lead to Tztle VI complaints. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: TrrLE VI AND ENvIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination 
by programs receiving federal financial assistance. l Under section 
602 of the statute, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has 
promulgated regulations that prohibit recipients of agency funding 
from engaging in actions that cause disparate impacts.2 
The growth of the environmental justice movement has led the 
EPA, environmentalists, state and local recipients, and industly to pay 
greater attention to Title VI. On February 11, 1994, President Clinton 
issued Executive Order 12,898, which requires federal agencies to 
develop environmental justice strategies.3 Clinton simultaneously 
issued a presidential directive on environmental justice, which requires 
federal agencies that provide funding to recipients with programs 
affecting human health or the environment to guarantee that their grant 
recipients comply with Title VI.4 
In February 1998, the EPA promulgated an Interim Guidance for 
Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits 
(Interim Guidance) to address when siting decisions may violate the 
statute.s While many commentators have criticized the Interim 
Guidance's definition of what constitutes a "disparate impact,'06 much 
less attention has been devoted to other portions of the Interim 
Guidance. For instance, the Interim Guidance fails to clarify what is 
an "equally effective" less discriminatory alternative, or what types of 
mitigation can be used to justify an otherwise unacceptable project.1 
This Article proposes several ways to improve the Interim 
Guidance's ability to protect minority groups. First, and most 
importantly, the burden should certainly be on the recipient agency to 





See Civil Rights Actofl964 §§ 601-605,42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1997). 
See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text. 
See Exec. Order 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859-60 (1994), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 
4. See Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 30 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 279, 
280 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
5. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR 
lNvEsTiGATING TrrLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS (Feb. 5, 
1998) (visited Nov. 21, 1998) <http://es.epagov/oecaloejltitlevi.htm1> [hereinafter EPA, 
INTERIM GUIDANCE]. 
6. See Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Comments on Title VI Guidance Seek 
Clearer DefinitiOns, Input from More Parties, Daily Env't L. Rep. (BNA), at B-1 (May 15, 
1998) (reporting that public commentators have criticized the Interim Guidance for failing to 
define terms "disparate impact" or "mitigation"); David Mastio, Green Monster, 50 NAT'L 
REv., July 6, 1998, at 22 (arguing that the Interim Guidance fails to define terms "disparate 
impact" or "impacted community''). 
7. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 11-12. 
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applicant's reasonable business needs. The Interim Guidance's 
requirement that an alternative be "equally effective"s makes it too 
easy for a pennitting agency and pennittee to use minor advantages to 
prefer their proposal to a reasonably effective less discriminatory 
alternative. Second, the pennitting agency and pennittee should have 
the burden of establishing that any mitigation measures used to reduce 
disparate impacts to an acceptable level will in fact work and reduce 
any risks to surrounding popUlations, including minority groups 
protected by Title VI, to pennissible levels. Moreover, the pennitting 
agency and pennittee should have the burden of examining whether 
such mitigation measures could themselves be used as less 
discriminatory alternatives that meet the applicant's reasonable 
business needs. Third, the EPA or recipients should offer technical 
assistance to Title VI complainants and should also provide Technical 
Assistance Grants (TAGs), so that complainants can hire their own 
technical experts. Fourth, recipients should adopt procedures to 
encourage early participation by affected populations, especially 
minority groups, to avoid controversies that lead to Title VI 
challenges. These amendments should protect minority and low-
income popUlations, while allowing state or local pennitting agencies 
and pennit applicants a reasonable opportunity to site needed facilities. 
Part II examines whether minorities are disproportionately 
affected by pollution and briefly discusses the EPA's response to 
environmental justice issues. Part ill provides an introduction to Title 
VI, the EPA's section 602 regulations and the EPA's efforts to enforce 
Title VI. Part IV discusses the burden of proof under existing Title VI 
and VII law. Part V reviews the Interim Guidance, and proposes four 
significant ways to improve it. . 
II. THE PROBLEM OF ''ENvIRONMENTAL JUSTICE" 
A. Empirical Evidence 
Several studies provide evidence that minority and low-income 
groups are exposed to disproportionate environmental risks.9 While 
8. Seeid. 
9. See CoMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHuRCH OF CHruST, TOXIC 
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES (1987) (involving the location of all 415 
commercial hazardous waste facilities in the contiguous United States that could be identified 
through the EPA's Hazardous Waste Data Management System, using zip code areas to 
derme minority and nonminority areas, and concluding that "[a]lthough socia-economic 
status appeared to play an important role in the location of commercial hazardous waste 
facilities, race still proved to be more significant''); BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN & LAURA 
FmoN, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE REVISITED: AN UPDATE OF THE 1987 REPORT ON THE 
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it may be understandable that developers would locate polluting 
facilities in areas where land is inexpensive and, consequently, where 
poor people are more likely to live, environmental justice has 
become a contentious political issue because studies show that such 
undesirable land uses are more likely to be located in areas with 
higher minority populations, even if the study controls for income 
levels. Some studies, however, have found no statistically significant 
difference in the percentage of minority popUlations living in areas 
with commercial hazardous waste facilities.10 It is difficult to decide 
RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CIiARACfERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAzARDous WA'5fE 
SITES (1994) (relying on zip code areas to find that the location of hazardous waste facilities 
reflects a national pattern of racial inequality that has gotten worse during the past decade); 
Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A 
Longitudinal Analysis oj Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1,9, 19-27,33-34 
(1997) (examining 544 communities, using 1990 census data, that hosted active commercial 
hazardous waste treatment storage and disposal facilities and finding no substantial evidence 
that commercial hazardous waste facilities that began operating between 1970 and 1990 were 
sited in areas that had disproportionate African-American or low-income populations, but 
finding evidence that Hispanics were disproportionately more likely to live near such 
facilities); 1 Tom Boer et aI., Is There Environmental Racism? The Demographics oj 
Hazardous Waste in Los Angeles County, 78 SOC. SCI. Q. 793 (1997) (finding that working 
class communities of color in industrial areas of Los Angeles are most affected by hazardous 
waste treatment storage and disposal facilities); Robert D. Bullard, Solid Waste and the Black 
Houston Community, 53 Soc. INQUIRY 273, 279-83 (1983) (finding that although African-
Americans made up only 28% of the Houston popUlation in 1980, 6 of Houston's 8 
incinerators and mini-incinerators and 15 of 17 landfills were located in predominantly 
African-American neighborhoods); Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and 
Discriminatory Siting: Risk-Based Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OIllO 
ST. L.1 329, 334-41 (1995) [hereinafter Mank, Environmental Justice] (summarizing studies 
finding that racial minorities and low-income persons live near pollution to a disproportionate 
extent); Evan J. Ringquist, Equity and the Distribution oj Environmental Risk: The Case oj 
TRI Facilities, 78 SOC. SCI. Q. 811 (1997) (fmding that Toxic Release Inventory facilities and 
pollutants are concentrated in residential zip codes with large minority populations); see also 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOIRCED-83-168, SITING OF HAzARDous WA'5fE 
LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING 
COMMUNITIES (1983) (examining racial and socioeconomic characteristics of the 
communities surrounding four off site hazardous waste landfills located in the eight 
southeastern states that make up the EPA's region N and finding that "[b]lacks make up the 
majority of the population in three of the four communities where the landfills are located"). 
10. Studies fmding no racial disparities are often based on census tract data as 
opposed to those based on zip code areas. See generally Andy B. Anderson et aI., 
Environmental Equity: Evaluating TSDF Siting Over the Past Two Decades, W A'5fE AGE, 
July 1994, at 83 (reporting analysis based on 1990 census data); Douglas L. Anderton et aI., 
Environmental Equity: The Demographics oj Dumping, 31 DEMOGRAPHY 229 (1994) 
(reporting analysis based on 1980 census data); James T. Hamilton, Politics and Social 
Costs: Estimating the Impact oJCollective Action on Hazardous Waste Facilities, 24 RAND J. 
EcON. 101, 117-18 (1993); Thomas Lambert & Christopher Boerner, Environmental 
IneqUity: Economic Causes, Economic Solutions, 14 YALE 1 ON REG. 195, 203-04 (1997) 
(using data from 1970, 1980 and 1990 censuses, and finding no statistical relationship 
between active hazardous and solid waste storage facilities and incinerators and minority 
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which studies are more convincing, because they have employed 
different definitions of what constitutes an affected minority 
population.ll For example, a study based on the percentage of 
minorities in the census tract surrounding a facility may come to a 
different result than one based on the percentage of minorities in the 
neighboring zip code areas, which are generally larger than census 
tracts. 12 On the whole, there is credible evidence that minority 
groups experience significant discrimination in some areas of the 
country.13 At the very least, there is evidence that disproportionate 
siting of polluting facilities occurs in some areas and that nationwide 
policies are needed to prevent inequities in the future. 14 
B. The Political Debate 
There has been an active political debate about the social 
benefits of the environmental justice movement. Industry argues that 
the economic benefits of its projects far outweigh risks, which 
environmentalists frequently exaggerate.1S Furthermore, industry 
suggests that the environmental justice movement may effectively 
discourage government officials from siting essential facilities that 
residents in st. Louis, but finding a weak relationship between minority and poor residents 
and facilities if inactive sites are added to the data set). 
11. See generally Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 329, 343 n.59, 390-
92 & n.373 (discussing how use of different definitions of subpopulations or geographical 
areas can dramatically affect research results); Paul Mohai, The Demographics of Dumping 
Revisited: Examining the Impact of Alternate MethodolOgies in Environmental Justice 
Research, 14 VA. ENvrL. L.J. 615 (1995) (same); Rae Zinunerrnan, Issues of Classification 
in Environmental Equity: How We Manage Is How We Measure, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 
633,665-69 (1994) (same); infra notes 127-128 and accompanying text. 
12. See Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Lond Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: 
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1401 n.73, 1402-03 & 
n.84 (1994) [hereinafter Been, Market Dynamics] (arguing that census tracts are more 
reliable means to define conununity than zip code areas); Been & Gupta, supra note 9, at lO-
13 (citing sources and contending that census tracts are generally more reliable means to 
defme conununity than zip code areas). 
13. See Been & Gupta, supra note 9, at 9, 19-27, 33-34; Michael Fisher, 
Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under TItle VI of the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 
285,299-301 (1995). 
14. See supra note 13. 
15. See Pollution in Minority and Inter-City Neighborhoods: Hearings Before the 
House Subcomm. on OverSight and Investigations, 105th Cong., Aug. 6, 1998, available in 
1998 WL 12763210 (recording testimony of Harry C. Alford, President/CEO, National Black 
Chamber of Conunerce, criticizing the EPA's environmental justice policies for discouraging 
economic development in minority areas); CHRISTOPHER BOERNER & THOMAS LAMBERT, 
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF AMERICAN BUSINESS, POLICY STUDY No. 121, ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE? 6, 12-13 (1994) [hereinafter BOERNER & LAMBERT, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE?]; 
infra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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would benefit minority and poor communities.16 Environmentalists, 
however, argue that environmental justice policies are essential to 
protect the public health and environment of minority and low-
income communities.17 
C. The EPA s Response to Environmental Justice Issues 
In 1990, during the Bush Administration, the EPA took its first 
steps toward addressing environmental justice issues by creating an 
EPA Environmental Equity Work Group, which issued a report in 
1992 encouraging the agency to conduct further studies in this area.IS 
Later that year, the EPA established an Office of Environmental 
Equity (now the Office of Environmental Justice) to address these 
issues.19 
Since 1993, the Clinton Administration has more aggressively 
tackled the problem of environmental justice. President Clinton's 
Executive Order 12,898 (Order) required all federal agencies to collect 
data about the health and environmental impact of their policies on 
minority groups and low-income popUlations and to develop policies 
to avoid adverse impacts on these groupS.20 The Order also mandated 
that every federal agency and department adopt environmental justice 
strategies by February 11, 1995?1 The Order and these strategies are 
16. See BOERNER & LAMBERT, ENvIRONMENTAL JUSTICE?, supra note 15, at 6, 12-13 
(1994); Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REv. 75, 83-84, 105-
08 (1996) (arguing that environmental justice policies may discourage economic 
development); Stephen C. Jones & Anoop G. Shroff, Environmental Justice Concerns Delay 
Industrial Expansion, 13 ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LmG. STRATEGY 1 (Oct. 1997) (same). 
17. See Paul Stanton KibeI, The Urban Nexus: Open Space, Brownfields, and 
Justice, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 589, 607-09 (1997-98) (reporting proponents of 
environmental justice are concerned that brownfie1ds redevelopment project will increase 
health risks without providing many jobs in minority communities); Mank, Environmental 
Justice, supra note 9, at 357-68 (arguing that risks of facilities may outweigh benefits); 
Samara F. Swanston, An Environmental Justice Perspective on Superfund Reauthorization, 9 
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 565, 572 (1994); Julia A. Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and 
the Role of Superfund: Legal Barriers to Redevelopment and Prospects for Change, 43 
BUFF. L. REv. 285, 308-11 (1995). 
18. See 1 ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, U.S. ENVIRONMENTALPR0TECI10N 
AGENCY, EPA 230-R-92-008, REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNlTlES 2 (1997). 
19. See James H. Colopy, Comment, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing 
Environmental Justice Through TItle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
125, 185-86 (1994). 
20. See Exec. Order 12,898, § 1-103,3 C.F.R. 859-60 (1994), reprinted in 42 U.S.c. 
§ 4321 (1997). 
21. See id. § 1-103(e). Federal Departments having fmal strategies for environmental 
justice include: Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Interior, Justice, Labor, 
Transportation, Health and Human Resources, and Housing and Urban Development; NASA 
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) also employ environmental justice 
strategies. See Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice: Notification of 
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not directly enforceable by private citizens through judicial action, but 
depend on the good faith of federal officials to follow them.22 
President Clinton's Presidential Directive on Environmental Justice, 
which accompanied the Order, emphasized that federal agencies 
should use existing law to enforce the Order's goals, especially by 
requiring their grant recipients to comply with Title VI.23 
ill. TITLEVI 
Because the EPA provides grants to almost all state and regional 
siting or permitting agencies, Title VI clearly applies to these 
agencies.24 Before 1993, however, EPA did not actively enforce 
compliance with Title VI by its grant recipients.25 In 1993, the EPA 
began a new policy of enforcing Title VI, and in 1994, the agency 
established an Office of Civil Rights to investigate Title VI 
complaints brought by private citizens against recipients.26 
A. TItle VI Agencies May Prohibit Disparate Impacts 
Under section 601 of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
federal agencies and departments may not provide funding to 
Availability of Final Federal Agency Environmental Justice Strategies, 60 Fed. Reg. 30,871 
(1995). 
22. See Bradford C. ManIc, Executive Order 12,898, in ENVlRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
(Michael Gerrard ed.) (forthcoming 1999). Some federal administrative law judges, 
however, have concluded that their agencies are bound to follow the Order and the agency's 
environmental justice strategy. See id. 
23. See Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 30 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 279, 
280 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
24. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice ": The Distributional 
Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787, 835-36 (1993) (reporting that in 
1986 the federal government provided 46% of the funding for state air pollution programs, 
33% of the funding for state water pollution programs, and 40% of the funding for state 
hazardous waste programs); Colopy, supra note 19, at 129, 154-55. Some local 
environmental agencies, however, are exempt from Title VI because they receive no federal 
funding. See Colopy, supra note 19, at 173. 
25. See Fisher, supra note 13, at 313-14; Lazarus, supra note 24, at 836-38 
(discussing the EPA's decision to deemphasize its civil rights responsibilities under Title VI); 
Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: The Need for a Disparate Impact 
Test and Improved Notice Requirements in Facility Citing Decisions, 19 COLUM. 1. ENvn.. L. 
211,228 (1994) (arguing that the EPA's stance that its decisionmaking was exempt from Title 
VI-"lacks support from any internal policy or legal precedent"); Colopy, supra note 19, at 
180-88 (discussing history of the EPA's enforcement of its Title VI regulations from 1975 to 
1993). During that time period, some federal agencies brought Title VI actions. See, e.g., 
North Carolina Dep't ofTransp. v. Crest St. Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6,9(1986). 
26. See Natalie M. Hammer, Comment, TItle VI as a Means of Achieving 
Environmental Justice, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 693, 711 (1996). In 1997, the agency also 
added a new civil rights legal division within the agency's Office of General Counsel to focus 
exclusively on these issues. See ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ALERT 31 (Dec. 31, 1997). 
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programs that discriminate on the basis of race.27 The United States 
Supreme Court has required proof of intentional discrimination 
before allowing compensatory damages under section 601 of Title 
VI?8 
Section 602 of the statute requires every federal agency or 
department to promulgate regulations that specify how the agency will 
detennine whether grant applicants or recipients are engaging in 
racially discriminatory practices and also to provide a process for 
investigating and reviewing complaints of racial discrimination filed 
with the agency?9 Beginning when the statute was enacted in 1964, 
ahnost all federal agencies have adopted Title VI regulations 
prohibiting disparate impact discrimination?O Courts have 
acknowledged the authority of agencies under section 602 of the 
statute to issue regulations forbidding recipients from engaging in 
actions causing disparate impact discrimination.31 
The EPA's section 602 regulations forbid recipients from creating 
disparate impacts: "A recipient [of federal funds] shall not use criteria 
27. See Civil Rights Act of1964 §§ 601-605,42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1997). Section 601 
of the statute provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance." Id. § 601. 
28. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 & n.2 (1983). 
Justices White and Marshall each maintained that showing disparate impacts was sufficient to 
prove a violation under section 601. See id. at 584 & n.2, 589-93 (White, 1., announcing the 
judgment of the Court); id. at 615,623 (Marshall, 1., dissenting). 
Id. 
29. See § 602. The statute provides: 
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal 
financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract 
other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to 
effectuate the provisions of section 601 with respect to such program or activity by 
issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be 
consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the 
financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken. 
30. See Guardians,463 U.S. at 592 n.13; Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating ntle VI: 
Defending Health Care Discrimination-It Shouldn t Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 939, 
947-48 (1990) (discussing how presidential task force helped agencies develop similar 
disparate impact regulations under Title Vl). 
31. See, e.g., Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 ("The threshold issue before the Court is 
whether the private plaintiffs in this case need to prove discriminatory intent to establish a 
violation of Title VI ... and administrative implementing regulations promulgated 
thereunder. I conclude, as do four other Justices, in separate opinions, that the Court of 
Appeals erred in requiring proof of discriminatory intent.''); see also Alexander v. Choate, 
469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985) (''The [Guardians] Court held that actions having an unjustifiable 
disparate impact on minorities could be redressed through agency regulations designed to 
implement the purposes of Title VI."); Lazarus, supra note 24, at 835; Colopy, supra note 19, 
at 159-60. 
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or methods of administering its program which have the effect of 
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, 
[ or] national origin ... .'>32 In addition, the agency's regulations 
proscribe recipients from choosing or approving a facility in an area 
where the plant will create discriminatory impacts that harm minority 
or ethnic groups covered by the statute.33 Also, the EPA regulations 
direct state recipients to establish compliance programs designed to 
prevent discrimination by the state or any beneficiaries of grants issued 
by the state.34 The Administrator of the EPA has authority under the 
regulations to refuse, delay or discontinue agency funding to any 
specific program or subprogram in which the agency has found 
discrimination. However, as shown in Part B, it is difficult for the 
agency to actually tenninate funding.3s 
B. EPA s Investigation and Enforcement of TItle VI Complaints 
Part III.B will briefly discuss the EPA's process for investigating 
Title VI complaints and sanctioning recipients that engage in 
discrimination. The main issue is that the EPA's Title VI regulations 
provide few rights for complainants, but many protections to 
recipients. Understanding this unequal treatment is crucial to 
grasping the arguments in Part V that recipients should generally 
bear the burden of proof, that either the EPA or recipients should 
provide technical assistance to complainants, and that recipients 
should establish programs to encourage early participation in 
permitting processes by a wide variety of groups, including minority 
and ethnic groups protected under Title VI. 
lt is relatively easy to file a Title VI complaint under EPA's 
section 602 regulations. A complainant may submit a short letter 
describing how a recipient is allegedly engaging in discriminatory 
practices.36 Fulfilling the minimum requirements for a complaint, 
32. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1997)." 
33. See id. (prohibiting location of facility that has discriminatory effect). Several 
other federal agencies have similar regulations forbidding siting or permitting actions by 
recipient agencies that cause disparate impact See, e.g., 10 C.F.R § 4.l2(c) (l998) (Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm'n); 10 C.F.R. § 1040.13(d) (l998) (Dep't of Energy); 32 C.F.R. 
§ 195.4(b)(I)(iii) (l997) (Dep't of Defense); 49 C.F.R § 21.5(b)(3) (1997) (Sec'y of 
Transp.); 23 C.F.R § 200.5(f) (1998) (Fed. Highway Admin.). 
34. See 28 C.F.R § 42.410 (1997). 
35. See 40 C.F.R § 7.l30(b)(3)(iii), (4); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. 
36. See 40 C.F.R § 7.120; Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, Environmental Justice and the 
EPA: The Brief History of Administrative Complaints Under Iitle VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964,9 ENVTL. L. & LmG. 309, 314-15, 319 (1994); Hammer, supra note 26, at 710-11. 
The EPA requires a complaint to be filed within 180 days of the last alleged discriminatory 
action, but complainants may request a waiver of the 180 day time limit for good cause. See 
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however, does not guarantee success. While legal or technical 
expertise is not needed to file a basic complaint, a complainant may 
need extensive technical assistance to understand complex 
demographic and pollution data that is often crucial in detennining 
whether discrimination has occurred.37 
hritially, the EPA conducts a preliminary investigation to 
determine whether the complaint states a valid c1aim.38 If it accepts a 
complaint for investigation, the EPA conducts that investigation as the 
agency sees fit, although it may occasionally consult with the 
complainant as a COurtesy?9 There is no way for a complainant to 
force the agency to expedite its investigation or reach a decision.40 If 
the Office of Civil Rights concludes that the recipient did not violate 
the agency's Title VI regulations, then the agency will dismiss the 
complaint.41 It is almost impossible for a complainant to challenge the 
agency's dismissal of a complaint under either Title VI42 or the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).43 
A complainant's limited rights to participate in the agency's 
investigation and to appeal a dismissal are significant problems 
because the agency dismisses many Title VI complainants.44 The EPA 
has never yet found a violation under Title VI against a recipient.4s 
On the other hand, recipients have substantial rights to challenge 
the agency's investigation and findings if the EPA finds a Title VI 
violation and seeks to impose sanctions, including termination of 
40 C.F.R. § 7.120(b)(2); see also EPA, INrEruM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 7-8 (explaining 
that the EPA might waive 180 day time limit for "good cause" if complaint was delayed 
because the complainants were exhausting the recipient's administrative remedies). 
37. See infra Part V. 
38. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(d)(l). 
39. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 706 n.41 (1979); Cole, supra 
note 36, at 321-23; Fisher, supra note 13, at316; Colopy, supra note 19, at 167. 
40. See Cole, supra note 36, at 321-22; Hammer, supra note 26, at 711. 
41. See 40 c.F.R. § 7.120(g). 
42. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 715 (suggesting that Title VI generally does not allow 
private suits against the federal government); Fisher, supra note 13, at 317 n.158. 
43. See Fisher, supra note 13, at 317 n.158; Colopy, supra note 19, at 168-69. A 
Title VI or APA suit against a federal agency might be permissible if the plaintiff charges the 
funding agency itself with discrimination, or with encouraging a recipient's discrimination. 
See Fisher, supra note 13, at 317 n.158. 
44. See Paul Connolly, Environmental Justice: Mayors Rap EPA at Meeting with 
Browner for Failure to Consult on Interim Guidance, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 658 (July 24, 
1998) (noting that as of July 1998, EPA had rejected a significant number of the complaints 
filed with the agency); Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Pennits Cited in Civil Rights 
Complaints Have Remained Valid, EPA Official Says, 152 Daily Env't L. Rep. (BNA) Aug. 
7, 1998, at A-9 (same) [hereinafter Hogue, Pennits Have Remained Valid]. 
45. See Julie R. Domike & Arthur W. Ray, EPA, Courts Focus on ntle VI Issues in 
Locating Industrial Plants in Low-Income Areas, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 1, 1997, at Cl; Hogue, 
Pennits Have Remained Valid, supra note 44, at A-9; Hammer, supra note 26, at 712-13. 
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funding. A recipient may appeal an adverse finding to an EPA 
administrative law judge (ALJ),46 then the EPA Administrator,47 and 
finally to an Article III federal COurt.48 In addition, the EPA cannot 
discontinue funding to a recipient until thirty days after it sends a full 
report to Congress.49 Because of these lengthy appeals processes, 
federal agencies rarely even attempt to terminate funding to a recipient 
that has engaged in discrimination, but simply require the recipient to 
avoid discriminatory practices in the future.50 The EPA has never 
formally terminated funding to any recipient.51 
The EPA's administrative process for investigating Title VI 
complainants and enforcing the statute provides little assistance to 
complainants and makes it difficult to punish recipients that engage in 
discrimination. The EPA should give complainants a greater 
opportunity to participate in investigations and the right to appeal 
dismissals at least to an agency administrative law judge.52 Limited 
procedural reforms, however, would not redress the fundamental 
imbalance of resources between complainants, who are often poor, and 
the typical state agency, which generally has a significant professional 
staff and a fairly large budget, especially compared to community 
organizations. Part V proposes a more ambitious plan to provide 
complainants with a reasonable opportunity to investigate their claims 
and to place an appropriate burden on recipients to justify their actions. 
rv. BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER TITLES VI AND VII 
While section 601 of Title VI only reaches intentional 
discrimination, agency regulations under section 602, including the 
EPA's, address recipient practices that cause disparate impacts 
against protected minority groupS.53 This Article will focus solely on 
the standard for proving disparate impacts and will not address the 
somewhat different issues raised by disparate treatment suits 
involving intentional discrimination. No reported Title VI cases have 
addressed environmental justice challenges, but some Title VI 
decisions involving the siting of public facilities are helpful in 
understanding a plaintiff's burden of proof and what defenses a 
46. See 40 C.ER § 7.130(b)(2) (1997). 
47. See id. § 7.l30(b)(3). 
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1997). 
49. See id. § 2000d-l; 40 C.ER § 7.130(b)(3)(iii). 
50. See Colopy, supra note 19, at 155. 
51. See Dornike & Ray, supra note 45, at CIS. 
52. Arguably, allowing a complainant to appeal dismissals to the Administrator of the 
EPA or to a federal court would be too costly. 
53. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
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defendant might raise.54 Furthennore, employment discrimination 
cases provide some insights, but Title VII's restrictive evidentiary 
standards are often inappropriate for Title VI challenges involving 
recipients who have voluntarily accepted federal grants.55 Part IV 
will focus on when a defendant may use business necessity to justify 
otherwise inappropriate disparate impacts, and when a plaintiff may 
demonstrate that a defendant failed to adopt a less discriminatory 
alternative. 
A. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Disparate Impacts 
A plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving a prima facie 
case. 56 A Title VII plaintiff must prove three elements in a prima 
facie case: (1) identify the specific employment practice that is being 
challenged, (2) show that the practice has a disproportionate impact 
on persons protected by the statute, and (3) demonstrate that the 
identified practice is the cause in fact of the alleged discrimination.57 
Title VI plaintiffs must prove the same second and third elements, 
but may not have to identify discriminatory practices with as much 
particularity as Title VII plaintiffs. 
First, a civil rights plaintiff must, to the extent possible, identify 
which practices or actions of a defendant are the source of 
discriminatory effects. Title VII, as amended by the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act, specifies that a plaintiff must "demonstrate that each particular 
challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact," unless the 
plaintiff can establish ''that the elements of a respondent's 
54. See, e.g., NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1334 (3d Cir. 
1981) (en banc) (challenging hospital relocation in Title VI suit); Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 
612,618-19 (2d Cir. 1980) (challenging the decision to close a municipal hospital in a Title 
VI action); Bryant v. New Jersey Dep't ofTransp., 998 F. Supp. 438 (D.N.I 1998) (finding 
that plaintiffs had standing under Title VI, but not ruling on merits of claim that state 
highway department's location of highway was discrimination in violation of Title VI); 
Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 127 (S.D. Ohio 
1984) (challenging state highway department's location of highway in Title VI suit); S. 
Watson, supra note 30, at 966-71 (discussing Title VI suits challenging hospital closings and 
relocations). 
55. See infra notes 146-147 and accompanying text 
56. See Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal 
Reconstruction, Fair Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 
EMORyL.J. 409, 422-23 (1998). 
57. See EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066,48 F.3d 594, 601 (1st Cir. 
1995); Mahoney, supra note 56, at 423,459-63; Linda Lye, Comment, TItle VII's Tangled 
Tale: The Erosion and Confusion of Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense, 
19 BERKELEY I EMP. & LAB. L. 315, 343 (1998). 
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decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis."s8 
It is not clear whether or to what extent the particularity requirement 
applies to Title VI, but a plaintiff challenging a permitting agency's 
siting criteria might have to identify which practices cause 
. discrimination. S9 
Second, civil rights plaintiffs must establish disparity by showing 
that persons of a particular race, color, or national origin protected by 
the statute are disproportionately included or excluded compared to a 
relevant groUp.60 The primary issue is usually whether a plaintiff has 
chosen an appropriate comparison groUp.61 For instance, a Title vn 
plaintiff in an employment case must correlate the race of those 
holding a particular type of employment with the pool of qualified job 
applicants.62 Similarly, a Title VI plaintiff challenging the location of a 
highway or hospital must compare the racial demographics of the site 
with appropriate alternative sites.63 Courts in employment 
discrimination cases have sometimes rejected sophisticated statistical 
models if either the minority populations or comparison groups 
selected are under- or over-inclusive.64 
Finally, to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must prove the 
identified practice actually caused the disparate impact. 6S In Title vn 
cases, courts usually require a plaintiff to prove causation through 
statistical evidence that a particular employment practice causes a 
"substantially" or "significantly" greater percentage of minorities to 
58. 42 US.C. § 2000e-2(k)(I)(B)(i) (1997) (emphasis added); see also Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 US. 642, 656-57 (1989) (requiring plaintiff to show that specific 
employment practice has caused disparate impacts); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 
US. 977, 994-95 (1988) (plurality opinion) (requiring plaintiff to "isolat[e] and identif[y] the 
specific" employment practices allegedly responsible for disparate impacts); MaiIoney, supra 
note 56, at 423, 459-60. 
59. See Vicki Been, Environmental Justice and Equity Issues, in 4 PATRICK J. ROHAN, 
ZONING AND LAND USE CoNTROLS § 25D.04[3][g][i], at 89 n.89 (1997) [hereinafter Been, 
Equity Issues]. 
60. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. ofEduc., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406-07 (11th Cir. 
1993); MaiIoney, supra note 56, at 423, 460-61; Daniel K. Hampton, Note, Title VI 
Challenges by Private Parties to the Location of Health Care Facilities: Toward a Just and 
EjJectiveAction, 37 B.G L. REv. 517, 530 (1996); Lye, supra note 57, at 343. 
61. SeeMaiIoney.supranote56.at 423,461. 
62. See Wards Cove, 490 US. at 650-51; MaiIoney, supra note 56, at 423,461; Lye, 
supra note 57, at 343. 
63. See Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 
127-28 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (comparing racial demographics of highway site with other 
alternatives); Been, Equity Issues, supra note 59, § 25D.04[3][g][i], at 90-92. 
64. See EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734,750-52 (S.D. Fla 
1989); Lye, supra note 57, at 343-44 & n.148 (citing cases). 
65. See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407; MaiIoney, supra note 56, at 423, 462-63; Hampton, 
supra note 60, at 530; Lye, supra note 57, at 343. 
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experience adverse results than an appropriate comparison groUp.66 
Under Title VI, courts have also frequently inferred causation based on 
statistical comparisons between minority host sites and the racial 
demographics of neighborhoods that would have been suitable for the 
facility.67 
It is uncertain how much evidence a Title VI plaintiff needs to 
establish that a recipient's decision to grant a permit to an industrial or 
disposal facility will cause disparate impacts. Defining the relevant 
affected population groups and comparison groups is more 
complicated in an environmental siting case. Depending on the facts 
in a particular case and type of pollution, the relevant population could 
be those living within one mile of a facility, or several miles from the 
site. There are even more complex problems in measuring the risks of 
carcinogenic and noncarcinogenic pollutants.68 
B. Defendant's Burden of Proof 
After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant 
bears the burden of either rebutting the plaintiff's prima facie 
evidence or showing the challenged practice is justified by business 
or educational necessity.69 Because courts are often relatively lenient 
in allowing a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, defendants 
rarely rest their entire defense on disproving the plaintiff's evidence 
and almost always try to prove their actions are justified by business 
66. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988) (plurality 
opinion); Mahoney, supra note 56, at 423, 462-63; see also Been, Equity Issues, supra note 
59, § 25D.04[3][g][i], at 89-90. 
67. See, e.g., Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407 (discussing standard under Title VI for proving 
causation); Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 
1417 (11th Cir. 1985) (basing prima facie case on evidence that racial composition of local 
defendant's classrooms differs from random distribution); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 
982-83 (9th Cir. 1984) (basing prima facie case on evidence that percentage of African-
American children in "educable mentally retarded" classes was higher than their percentage 
in school population as a whole); Coalition of Concerned Citizens, 608 F. Supp. at 127 
(finding prima facie case where people of color represented between 50% and 90% of 
neighborhoods in which proposed highway would be located); Been, Equity Issues, supra 
note 59, § 25D.04[3][g][i], at 90-91; Terence J. Centner et aI., Environmental Justice and 
Toxic Releases: Establishing Evidence of Discriminatory Effect Based on Race and Not 
Income,3 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 119, 139 (1996). 
68. See generally Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A 
Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562,584-616 (1992) 
(arguing that comparative risk analysis has many limitations); Mank, Environmental Justice, 
supra note 9, at 394-97 (same). 
69. See Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact 
Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REv. 387, 394 (1996); Mahoney, supra note 56, at 424. 
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necessity.70 It is sometimes possible, however, for a defendant to 
rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case.7I 
Before 1989, some Title VI and VII cases placed both the 
burdens of production and persuasion on defendants once a plaintiff 
established a prima facie case.72 Other lower court decisions, however, 
held that after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of 
going forward shifts to the defendant, while the ultimate burden of 
persuasion remains with the plaintiff.73 In 1989, the Supreme Court, in 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonia, endorsed the latter approach.74 
In the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress rejected Wards Cove's 
holding that the ultimate burden of persuasion always remains with the 
plaintiff, and placed both the burdens of production and persuasion on 
the defendanes The 1991 Act explicitly amended Title VII to place 
the burden of persuasion on the defendant ''to demonstrate that the 
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and 
consistent with business necessity," unless the defendant has rebutted 
the plaintiff's prima case by "demonstrat[ing] that a specific 
employment practice does not cause the disparate impact.,,76 The 1991 
Act does not apply to Title VI, but several commentators have 
predicted that courts will place the burden of proof on Title VI 
defendants either to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case or to justify 
their actions.77 
70. See Mahoney, supra note 56, at 424,469-71. 
71. See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1412-13. 
72. See Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982 n.9 (holding burden of persuasion shifts to 
defendant if plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of disparate impact); Georgia State 
Conference,775 F.2d at 1417 (same); Been, Equity Issues, supra note 59, § 25D.04[3][g], at 
87-88 n.85; Centner et aI., supra note 67, at 138-40; Fisher, supra note 13, at 320-21. 
73. See NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1333 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(en banc); Coalition of Concemed Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110,127 
(S.D. Ohio 1984) (stating that, after defendant presents justification for actions, "[t]he 
ultimate burden of proving illegal discrimination remains with plaintiffs"); Been, Equity 
Issues, supra note 59, § 25D.04[3][g], at 87-88 n.85; Fisher, supra note 13, at 320-21. 
74. 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989); see Mahoney, supra note 56, at 452-53. 
75. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. 
§ 2000e-2(k) (1997)); Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that 1991 Act places burden of persuasion regarding business necessity on 
defendant in Title VII case); Fitzpatrickv. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117 & n.5 (11th Cir. 
1993) (same); Frazierv. Garrison Indep. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 1514, 1525 n.34 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(same); Been, Equity Issues, supra note 59, § 25D.04[3][g], at 87-88 n.85; Mahoney, supra 
note 56, at 454-55; Lye, supra note 57, at 348. 
76. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(I)(A)(i), (B)(ii) (1997). The 
1991 Act defines "demonstrate" to require a defendant to "meetD the burdens of production 
and persuasion." § 2000e(m). 
77. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. ofEduc., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 n.14 (11th Cir. 
1993); Been, Equity Issues, supra note 59, § 25D.04[3][g], at 87-88; Fisher, supra note 13, at 
321; Paul K. Sonn, Fighting Minority Underrepresentation in Publicly Funded Construction 
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C. Justifications Under TItles VI and VII 
1. How Essential Must a Justification be Under Title VII 
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., a unanimous Supreme Court held 
that facially neutral educational requirements and testing practices 
that had significant disproportionate impacts on African-Americans 
violated Title VII unless the defendant could justify these practices 
by proving ''business necessity" and a "manifest relationship" to its 
legitimate interests.78 Subsequent cases are split as to how essential a 
challenged practice must be to a defendanfs business. Some courts 
have required that a practice not only advance, but be essential to, a 
defendant's business.79 Other decisions have interpreted Griggs' 
"manifest relationship" language merely to require a defendant to 
demonstrate that a practice significantly or substantially advances its 
legitimate goals.80 In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court, albeit in dicta, 
Projects After Croson: A Title VI Litigation Strategy, 101 YALE LJ. 1577, 1596-97 (1992); 
Colopy, supra note 19, at 163-64. But cj Scelsa v. City Univ. ofN.Y., 806 F. Supp. 1126, 
1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (fmding, albeit in dicta, that burden of persuasion in Title VI cases 
remains at all times with plaintiff, but not referring to 1991 Act). Indeed, it could be argued 
that a broad disparate impact approach is more suitable for the public funding issues relevant 
to Title VI than to the private sphere of employment under Title VII. See Watson, supra note 
30, at 971-75. 
78. 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971); see also Grover, supra note 69, at 389; Philip S. 
Runkel, Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Continuation of the Wards Cove Standard of 
Business Necessity?, 35 WM. & MAR,yL. REv. 1177, 1182-83 (1994) (observing that Griggs 
contains five different verbal formulations for how employer must justify disproportionate 
impacts under Title VIl). 
79. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 (1977) (noting that the 
defendant's business must ''necessitateD'' the practice); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 
331-32 (1977) (stating that defendant must prove that height and weight requirements are 
"essential" to job performance); Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 104142 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (stating that the practice must be compelIing enough to override its discriminatory 
effects), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989); Craig v. Alabama State Univ., 804 F.2d 682, 
689 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that the practice must be essential to its objectives); Williams v. 
Colorado Springs, Colo. Sch. Dist No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 842 (lOth Cir. 1981) (same); 
Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1168 (5th Cir. 1976) (same); United States v. St. 
Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (stating that the defendant's 
practice must be "essential''); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d 
Cir. 1971); see also Mark S. Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 318, 343 (1987) (citing cases); Grover, supra note 69, at 389-90; 
Pamela L. Perry, Balancing Equal Employment Opportunities with Employers' Legitimate 
Discretion: The Business Necessity Response to Disparate Impact Discrimination Under 
Title VII, 12 INDus. REL. L.J. 1, 11-17,25-28 & 49 nn.233-34 (1990) (discussing the law of 
"business necessity" and citing cases). But cj Rosemary Alito, Disparate Impact 
Discrimination Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 1011, 1031 (1993) 
(arguing that the Dothard decision "did not require that the criterion be necessary for the 
business to survive or for the job to be done at all but rather that it be 'necessary' for the job 
to be done well"). 
80. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979) 
(referring with approval to the trial court's holding that the defendant's refusal to hire 
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stated that a challenged practice need not "be 'essential' or 
'mdispensable' to the employer's business for it to pass muster.,,81 It 
is unclear whether the Court was endorsing prior case law following 
the lesser "manifest relationship" approach, or adopting an even 
more lenient approach.82 
The 1991 Civil Rights Act clearly rejected Wards Cove's lighter 
burden on the employer to prove business necessity, but left many 
questions unanswered about how essential the defendant's justification 
must be.83 The 1991 Act requires Title VII defendants ''to demonstrate 
that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question 
and consistent with business necessity.,,84 An interpretive 
memorandum in the legislative history provides that "[t]he tenns 
'business necessity' and 'job related' are intended to reflect the 
concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co. and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio.,,85 While explicitly repudiating Wards Cove, 
the 1991 Act failed to address the problem that the Supreme Court's 
decisions prior to that case were not consistent. 86 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not clearly set out how 
necessary a practice must be or how the business necessity standard 
relates to the issue of whether the defendant could adopt a less 
methadone users was justified because its goals "are significantly served by-even if they do 
not require--[that] rule"); GiIlespie v. Wisconsin, 771 F.2d 1035, 1039-40 (7th Cir. 1985); 
Contreras v. City ofL.A., 656 F.2d 1267, 1280 (9th Cir. 1981); Chrisner v. Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1262 (6th Cir. 1981); see also Grover, supra note 69, at 390; 
Peny, supra note 79, at 11-24, 50-53. 
81. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989). The Court 
explained that "this degree of scrutiny would be almost impossible for most employers to 
meet, and would result in a host of evils." Id. 
82. See Peny, supra note 79, at 23-24,45-50; Watson, supra note 30, at 960-62. 
83. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (1997). 
84. Id.; Elston v. Talledega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 n.l4 (11 th Cir. 
1993); Colopy, supra note 19, at 163-64. 
85. 137 CONGo REc. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (citations omitted); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(I)(C) (1997) (providing that plaintiffs' opportunity to demonstrate that a 
de~endant failed to adopt an alternative practice with less discriminatory effect "shall be in 
accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989 [the day before Wards Cove was 
decided] with respect to the concept of 'alternative employment practice"'); Been, Equity 
Issues, supra note 59, § 25D.04[3][g][ii][B], at 97. 
86. Compare New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979) 
(referring with approval to the trial court's holding that the defendant's refusal to hire 
methadone users was justified because its goals "are significantly served by-even if they do 
not require-[that] rule"), with Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977) (noting 
that the defendant must prove height and weight requirements are "necessary" to job 
perfonnance). See also Grover, supra note 69, at 392-93; Mahoney, supra note 56, at 455-
56. 
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discriminatory altemative.87 Since 1991, federal courts have applied at 
least four different tests for determining the burden placed on 
defendants under the business necessity standard:88 (1) compelling 
necessity,89 (2) demonstrably necessary to meet an important business 
goal,90 (3) reasonably necessary to meet an important business 
objective,91 or (4) that the selection criteria bear a manifest relationship 
to the employment and serve legitimate business goalS.92 
One interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is that it 
implicitly rejects some earlier decisions holding that Griggs' "manifest 
relationship" language merely requires a defendant to demonstrate that 
a practice significantly or substantially advances its legitimate goals, 
and thereby makes it more difficult for defendants to prove business 
necessity.93 The statute explicitly requires both business necessity and 
job relatedness. The mandate that an employer demonstrate job 
relatedness arguably tightens the business necessity standard by 
demanding that a practice be necessary for the job at issue.94 If a 
practice such as requiring a diploma merely serves the function of 
making employees appear to be well educated to outsiders, but is not 
essential to performing ajob, then the 1991 Act arguably prohibits that 
type of practice.9S 
Another possible interpretation is that the 1991 Act makes it 
easier for defendants to prove business necessity because the statute 
uses the term "consistent with" business necessity.96 While the 1991 
87. See Grover, supra note 69, at 396-97. 
88. See Lye, supra note 57, at 348-53. 
89. See Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., 7 F.3d 795, 797-99 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding 1991 
Act places burden of showing "compelling need" regarding business necessity on defendant); 
Nash v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 895 F. Supp. 1536, 1545 (M.D. Fla. 1995) 
(holding that 1991 Act places burden of showing "sufficiently compelling" business purpose 
on defendant in Title VII case), aff'd, 85 F.3d 643 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Lye, supra note 
57, at 349-50. 
90. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that 1991 Act places burden of showing "demonstrabl[e] necessity" regarding 
business necessity on defendant in Title VII case); see also Lye, supra note 57, at 350-51. 
91. See Donnelly v. Rhode Island Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 929 F. Supp. 
583,593 (D.RI. 1996) (stating that, to prove business necessity under 1991 Civil Rights Act, 
the defendant must prove ''that the challenged practice is reasonably necessary to achieve an 
important business objective"), aff'd, 110 F.3d 2 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Mahoney, supra 
note 56, at 455-58 (arguing most courts since 1991 have followed Wards Cove's approach to 
what is a "legitimate business justification"); id. at 472-73 (agreeing with Donnelly's relaxed 
''reasonably necessary" interpretation of business necessity); Lye, supra note 57, at 351-52. 
92. See Stenderv. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 321-22 (N.D. Cal. 1992); see 
also Lye, supra note 57, at 352-53. 
93. See Grover, supra note 69, at 396-97. 
94. Seeid. 
95. Seeid. 
96. See supra note 91. 
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Act clearly placed the burden of persuasion in proving business 
necessity on defendants, some courts have suggested that the Wards 
Cove and Watson decisions' more relaxed approach as to what 
constitutes a legitimate business justification remains valid.97 
Accordingly, in Donnelly v. Rhode Island Board of Governors for 
Higher Education, the United States District Court of Rhode Island 
held that a Title VII defendant must prove that a "challenged practice 
is reasonably necessary to achieve an important business objective."98 
2. Types of Evidence that Constitute a Valid Business Justification 
Title VII does not specify what type of evidence might 
constitute a valid business justification for a challenged practice.99 A 
relaxed approach to proving business necessity is consistent with 
earlier Title VII cases in which courts have allowed a defendant to 
introduce evidence of significant cost savings, efficiency gains, or 
safety considerations as justification for either business practices or 
decisions having disparate impacts. 100 In both Wards Cove and the 
earlier Watson plurality decision, the Supreme Court stated that 
"[f]actors such as the cost or other burdens" of alternative practices 
are legitimate justifications for disparate impacts. 101 Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court and lower courts in some cases have recognized 
97. See EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 601 n.6 (I st Cir. 
1995) (concluding that Wards Cove remains good law except for portions explicitly rejected 
by 1991 Civil Rights Act); see also Mahoney, supra note 56, at 455-58 & n.198, 472-73 
(arguing most courts since 1991 have followed Wards Cove's approach to what denotes a 
"legitimate business justification"). 
98. 929 F. Supp. 583,593 (D.R.1. 1996) (emphasis added), aff'd, lIO F.3d 2 (1st Cir. 
1997); see also Mahoney, supra note 56, at 472-73 (applauding the careful analysis of 
Donnelly's relaxed ''reasonably necessary" interpretation of business necessity). 
99. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988) (plurality 
opinion) (stating that employers are not required to introduce formal validation studies 
showing that their criteria actually predict on the job performance); see also Mahoney, supra 
note 56, at 475. 
100. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998 (permitting defendant to present evidence of cost 
and other burdens in assessing whether plaintiff's proposed "less-discriminatory" altematives 
meet defendant's legitimate business goals); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 
568, 587 n.31 (1979) (finding that safety and cost savings justify disparate impacts in Title 
VII case); Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 570-71 (1978) (same); Brodin, 
supra note 79, at 344-57 (citing cases). But see Brodin, supra note 79, at 353-54 & n.203 
(criticizing cost-based defenses); Grover, supra note 69, at 398 n.40; Note, The Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 and Less Discriminatory Alternatives in Disparate Impact Litigation, 106 HARV. 
L. REv. 1621, 1624-26 (1993) [hereinafter Note, Less Discriminatory Alternatives] 
(contending that courts should reject cost based defenses in disparate impact litigation). 
101. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989) (quoting Watson, 
487 U.S. at 998). 
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defendants' concerns about safety as justifying disparate impacts on 
employment decisions. ,o2 
If courts adopt a strict necessity approach to proving business 
necessity, defendants would have a greater burden in trying to use cost, 
efficiency or safety justifications. A strict necessity approach would 
be similar to Title VII cases involving disparate treatment of women 
and intentional gender discrimination, where the Supreme Court has 
generally rejected the defense of increased cost or reproductive safety 
when raised as a bona fide occupational justification for either not 
hiring women or for requiring them to contribute more to a pension 
because they live longer than men.I03 
3. Title VI Prohibits Unjustified Disparate hnpacts 
The EPA's Title VI regulations prohibit recipients from 
engaging in any practices that cause discriminatory effects.104 In 
Title VI decisions involving other agencies, however, courts have 
generally interpreted similar regulations to allow recipients to present 
a defense of business or educational necessity as a justification for 
practices causing disparate impacts. IDS I argue, in Part V.B.1, to limit, 
but not eliminate, the ability of Title VI recipients to present such 
defenses, by requiring them to adopt a less discriminatory alternative 
unless it would cost significantly more or would be much less 
efficient or safe. 
102. See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587 n.31 (fmding that safety concerns justify disparate 
impacts in Title VII case); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-36 (1977) (same); 
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112,1119-21 (11th Cir. 1993) (same). 
103. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-211 
(1991) (rejecting cost and safety as justification for not hiring women to lead exposed 
positions because of risks to any potential fetus); City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-18 & n.32 (1978); see also Grover, supra note 69, at 398 n.40; 
Note, Less Discriminatory Alternatives, supra note 100, at 1624-26. 
104. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text 
105. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d l394, 1412-l3 (11th Cir. 
1993); Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417-18 
(I Ith Cir. 1985); NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d l322, l334 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(en banc) (stating that "challenged practice must not only affect disproportionately, it must do 
so unnecessarily"); Coalition of Concemed Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 
110, 127 (S.D. Ohio 1984) ("Defendants are not per se prohibited from locating a highway 
where it will have differential impacts upon minorities. Rather, Title VI prohibits taking 
actions with differential impacts without adequate justification."); Been, EqUity Issues, supra 
note 59, § 25D.04[3][g], at 88 n.87; Fisher, supra note l3, at 321; Sonn, supra note 77, at 
1598. 
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D. Plaintiff's Demonstration of Alternative Sites 
Under Title vn, if a defendant presents a legitimate justification 
for its behavior, the plaintiffbears the ultimate burdens of production 
and persuasion to demonstrate either that the defendant's justification 
is actually a pretext for a discriminatory purpose, or that the 
defendant has refused to utilize an "alternative employment practice" 
that would achieve its legitimate goals with less discriminatory 
harm.106 The 1991 Civil Rights Act codified the rule that the plaintiff 
has the burden of demonstrating the existence of alternative 
employment practices, and also specifies that a plaintiff may prevail 
only if the defendant employer ''refuses to adopt such alternative 
employment practice.,,107 
Title vn law is less clear about the degree to which a plaintiff 
must establish that an alternative is equally effective in addressing the 
defendant's legitimate business needs. lOS In 1989, the Supreme Court 
in Wards Cove followed Watson and held that plaintiffs must prove 
that a less discriminatory alternative is equally effective: '''[fJactors 
such as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative selection 
devices are relevant in determining whether they would be equally as 
effective as the challenged practice in serving the employer's 
legitimate business goals. ",109 While the 1991 Act clearly rejected 
Wards Cove's holding that plaintiffs had the ultimate burden of 
persuasion on the issue of business necessity, the statute did not clearly 
reject that decision's holding that plaintiffs must prove that a less 
discriminatory alternative is equally effective. The 1991 Civil Rights 
Act appeared to reject Wards Cove's approach to the issue of 
alternative selection practices by stating that Title vn law on that issue 
would return to what it had been one day prior to the Supreme Court's 
decision. Unlike the issue of burden of proof for business necessity 
for which only prior Supreme Court decisions were allowed to define 
the law, the 1991 Act left standing as precedent prior lower court 
decisions for defining the plaintiff's burden for establishing suitable 
106. See 42 US.C. § 2000e-2(k)(I)(A)(i) (1997); Albemarle Paper Co. Y. Moody, 422 
US. 405, 425 (1975) (stating that, once the defendant presents a legitimate justification for its 
behavior, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that "other tests or selection devices, 
without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate 
interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship"') (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. Y. 
Green,411 US. 792, 802 (1973)); Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1117-19; see also Mahoney, supra 
note 56, at 483-84. 
107. § 2000e-2(k)(I)(A)(ii); Mahoney, supra note 56, at 484. 
108. See Mahoney, supra note 56, at 486-88. 
109. Wards Cove Packing Co. Y. Atonio, 490 US. 642, 661 (1989) (quoting Watson Y. 
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 US. 977, 998 (1988) (plurality opinion)). 
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alternatives, including many decisions that had followed the same 
equally effective standard for alternatives as Wards Cove and 
Watson. lIO Several recent cases have continued to follow Wards 
Cove's requirement that plaintiffs prove that an alternative would be 
equally effective, would have less disproportionate effect and would 
not cost significantly more. 1 1 1 Other cases have employed the possibly 
different standard that a plaintiff must demonstrate that a less 
discriminatory alternative is "comparably effective."112 
V. EPNs "INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INvEsTIGATING TITLE VI 
ADMINISTRATNE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS": 
PLACING THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON PLAINTIFFS 
As discussed above,l13 the EPA issued the Interim Guidance to 
help the agency assess such complaints.1l4 Many commentators have 
criticized the Interim Guidance because it only vaguely addresses 
critical terms, such as what constitutes a "disparate impact."llS Most 
commentators, however, have failed to examine other important 
definitions in the Interim Guidance, including the extent to which 
mitigation measures may compensate for disparate impacts, and the 
circumstances under which an alternative should be considered 
"equally effective." 
I propose, in Part V.B, four major ways to improve the Interim 
Guidance.1I6 First, the EPA should place the burden on the recipient to 
demonstrate that no less discriminatory alternative exists that would 
meet the applicant's reasonable business needs. Second, the EPA 
should require the recipient to establish that any proposed mitigation 
measures will actually reduce any risks from the proposed facility to 
permissible levels, and to examine whether such mitigation measures 
110. See § 2000e-(2)(k)(I); see also Mahoney, supra note 56, at 486 n.298 (stating 
that the 1991 Act reinstates only Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove on burden of 
proof for business necessity, but reinstates all court decisions prior to Wards Cove on defming 
altematives). 
Ill. See York v. AT&T, 95 F.3d 948,955 (lOth Cir. 1996); MacPherson v. University 
of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 771 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661); 
Mahoney, supra note 56, at 486-89. 
112. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1118-19 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(requiring the plaintiff to show that a less discriminatory, comparably effective altemative 
exists). Part V.C.l.a will discuss the standard under Title VI for establishing that suitable less 
discriminatory altematives exist. See infra Part V.C.1.a 
113. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
114. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 20. 
115. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
116. The EPA can emphasize that it will be less likely to fmd Title VI violations if a 
recipient has adopted such procedures. 
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could be used at alternative sites that could meet the applicant's 
reasonable business needs with less discriminatory impacts. Third, the 
EPA itself should furnish technical assistance and technical assistance 
grants to Title VI complainants, or require recipients to do so. Finally, 
the EPA should strongly encourage recipients to adopt procedures to 
encourage early participation by affected populations, and especially 
minority groups, to avoid controversies that lead to Title VI 
challenges. 
A. Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative 
Complaints Challenging Permits 
1. The EPA Issues the Interim Guidance and Promises to Revise It 
Public commentary on the Interim Guidance has generally been 
negative. Most commentators agree that the Interim Guidance only 
vaguely defines crucial terms such as "disparate impacts.,,117 
Furthermore, many state and local regulators and industry groups 
have asked the EPA to rescind the Interim Guidance because they 
fear that strict enforcement will discourage industry from building 
new industrial facilities and creating jobs in minority areas.ll8 
Congressional Republicans in the House of Representatives have 
enacted legislation placing a moratorium on the agency from 
accepting new Title VI complaints until it issues a final Title VI 
guidance and held hearings to pressure the EPA to either rescind or 
modify the Interim Guidance to make it less stringent and to allow 
industry greater freedom to develop in minority areas.119 Many 
117. See Jeffrey B. Gracer, Taking Environmental Justice Claims Seriously, 28 ENVTL. 
L. REP. (News & Analysis) 10,373, 10,375 (1998); Pollution in Minority and Inner-City 
Neighborhoods: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on OverSight and Investigations, 
105th Cong., Aug. 6, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12763021 (testimony of Michael Hogan, 
New Jersey Dept of Environmental Protection, criticizing Interim Guidance for failing to 
define "disparate impact," "community," or "mitigation''); Pollution in Minority and Inner-
City Neighborhoods: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations, 105th Cong., Aug. 6, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12763097 (testimony of 
Barry McBee, Chainnan of Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, stating that 
Texas shares concerns of other states that there are problems with Interim Guidance); supra 
notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
118. See Environmental Council of States Resolution on EPA Interim Guidance for 
Investigating Permit Challenges Approved March 26, 1998, 59 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) E-l 
(Mar. 27, 1998); Environmental Justice: U.S. Conference of Mayors Calls on EPA to 
Suspend Guidance on Civil Rights, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 469, 469 (June 26, 1998) 
[hereinafter Conference of Mayors]. 
119. In October 1998, Congress enacted and President Clinton reluctantly signed an 
appropriations bill that contains a rider prohibiting the EPA from accepting new Title VI 
complaints after the date of its enactment until the agency issues a fmalized guidance on such 
complaints; however, the legislation does not affect about 15 existing Title VI complaints. 
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environmentalists, civil rights groups and minority members of 
Congress, however, have cautiously defended the Interim Guidance 
as a first step toward more stringent enforcement of the statute.120 
Because of broad public criticism, the EPA has promised to 
revise the Interim Guidance and issue a final Interim Guidance in 
1999.121 Both the EPA's advisory committee on Title VI and its 
independent Science Advisory Board (SAB) will make 
recommendations on how to improve the Interim Guidance before the 
agency takes final action. 122 
2. Three Trouble Areas: Disparate Impacts, Mitigation, and 
Alternatives 
There are three major problems with the Interim Guidance. 
First, it does not adequately explain how the agency will measure the 
amount and harmfulness of pollution and decide which populations 
will be affected by a facility, in detennining whether granting a 
permit will cause significant disparate impacts. In particular, the 
agency fails to provide a clear methodology for measuring the 
cumulative burdens of all facilities impacting an affected population 
See Veteran Affairs andHUD Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-276,112 Stat. 2461, 2496 
(1998); Cindy Skrzycki, The Regulators: With EPA as Judge, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1998, at 
FOI (stating appropriations bill bars EPA from accepting new Title VI complaints until 
agency amends its policies); Bill Walsh, Law Puts EPA Bias Rule on Hold: Industry Targets 
Racism Probes, NEW ORLEANS TIMEs-PICAYUNE, Oct. 23, 1998, at A8 (same); see also EPA 
Will Limit Scope of Environmental Justice Investigations, ENvrL. POL'y ALEIIT, Dec. 2, 
1998, at 7 (reporting Representative Tom BIiley's staff is investigating development of EPA's 
Title VI policy). 
120. See EPA Will Limit Scope, supra note 119, at 7 (reporting Congressional Black 
Caucus favors EPA's Title VI policy). But see David Mastid, Caucus Opposes EPA Rule: 
Rule Linking Pollution, Civil Rights 'Worst of Both Worlds, ' One Says, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 
4, 1998, at Bl (reporting National Black Caucus of State Legislators opposes EPA's Title VI 
policy because it is too weak to protect minorities, but vague enough to stop job creation in 
minority areas). 
121. See Pollution in Minority and Inner-City Neighborhoods: Hearings Before the 
House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 105ili Cong., Aug. 6, 1998 (testimony of 
Anne Goode, Director of Civil Rights, U.S. EPA); Connolly, supra note 44, at 658; Cheryl 
Hogue, Draft Revision of Guidance for Processing Rights Camplaints Expected by Mid-
1999,29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1807, 1807 (Jan. 15, 1999) (reporting EPA willlikeIy issue a 
draft revision of its Interim Guidance on Title VI complaints by mid-1999); Hogue, Pennits 
Have Remained Valid, supra note 44, at A-9. 
122. See Connolly, supra note 44, at 658; Hogue, Pennits Have Remained Valid, 
supra note 44, at A-9; Cheryl Hogue, SAB Recommends Steps for EPA in Analyses of 
Disproportionate Impacts, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1310, 1310-11 (Oct. 30, 1998) [hereinafter 
Hogue, SAB Recommends Steps] (stating Science Advisory Board proposes iliat EPA conduct 
disproportionate impact analysis in a step-by-step fashion); Amy Porter, Environmental 
Justice: Agency Relying on Advisory Committee to Face State TItle VI Guidance Concerns, 
28 Env'tRep. (BNA) 2690, 2690 (Apr. 17, 1998). 
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group. Second, the Interim Guidance does not explain when and to 
what extent mitigation measures may offset any disparate impacts. 
Third, the Interim Guidance does not specify whether complainants 
or recipients have the burden of proving that the recipient failed to 
select a less discriminatory alternative and does not clarify what is an 
"equally effective" alternative. 
a Measuring Disparate Impacts 
The Interim Guidance does not adequately explain how the 
agency will measure the amount and harmfulness of pollution, in 
order to decide which populations will be affected by a facility. First, 
the Interim Guidance,gives the agency considerable wiggle room by 
indicating that the agency may use several different techniques in 
assessing disparate impacts and then reach a final evaluation based 
on the "totality of circumstances that each case presents."123 The 
Interim Guidance does specify that the agency will usually undertake 
a five step process in assessing whether a disparate impact exists. 124 
The key to the five steps is identifying the "most affected population 
groups" and facilities within the scope of the agency's cumulative 
pollution burden analysis.125 The Interim Guidance states that the 
agency will usually examine not just the facility applying for a new 
or renewed permit, but will evaluate the cumulative burden of both 
existing and proposed facilities on "affected populations.,,126 The 
EPA is more likely to find that disparate impacts exist if there are 
already many polluting facilities in an area.127 
For the purposes of this Article, the crucial point is that a 
cumulative burden analysis, which examines all the proposed and 
existing facilities in a given area, is far more complex than simply 
measuring the impact of a single facility. Not surprisingly, a state 
official has strongly argued that the EPA should examine only the 
123. EPA, INfERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 9. 
124. See id. at 9-11. First, the agency must define the population groups that are most 
greatly affected by a proposed or existing facility. Second, the agency conducts a 
demographic Study of the most affected population groups. Third, the EPA must define 
which facilities and populations are within the scope of its cumulative pollution burden 
analysis. Fourth, the agency analyzes whether there are any disparate impacts by comparing 
the racial or ethnic composition within the affected populations to altemative areas that could 
have served as the site for the facility. Finally, the agency evaluates the statistical 
significance of any disparities. See id. 
125. Seeid. 
126. Seeid. at9-11 &nn.12-l3. 
127. Seeid. at IOn.l3. 
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emissions resulting from the permit under challenge.128 That official 
contends that existing emissions data is irrelevant in deciding whether 
disparities result from the particular permitting decision at issue.129 
Environmentalists and civil rights advocates would usually prefer to 
perform a cumulative burdens analysis because such an approach is 
probably more likely to demonstrate disparities than looking at 
emissions from a single facility applying for a permit. Nonetheless, 
the result still depends on how the EPA defines the relevant population 
groups and facilities in an analysis. 
It is possible that the final Title VI interim guidance will provide 
better and clearer definitions of crucial terms, including disparate 
impacts, affected populations, and cumulative burdens.130 The SAB 
has already recommended that the EPA examine not just whether 
disparities exist between different population groups, but whether the 
group at greater risk is exposed to an unacceptable level of risk.131 
This Article predicts that, while the EPA may improve its 
definition of disparate impacts, affected populations, and cumulative 
burdens, the agency will not be able to develop a single, easy method 
for measuring any of these terms because there are too many complex 
variables. No definition can avoid the very complexity of defining 
disparate impacts, of defining and measuring the cumulative burdens 
of pollution, and of assessing the appropriate demographic 
populations.132 As discussed in Part II, studies have reached different 
results about whether minority groups are disproportionately located 
near industrial or disposal facilities because some studies, for instance, 
have used census tracts as the unit of measurement, while others have 
used zip code areas.133 
It is crucial that both recipients and complainants have the 
resources and technical expertise to challenge agency data, because 
128. See Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Consider Only Emissions Due to 
Permit Under Challenge. Louisiana Official Says, 173 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) A-3 (Sept. 8, 
1998) [hereinafter Hogue, Consider Only Emissions] (discussing comments of Bliss Higgins 
of the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality). 
129. Seeid. 
130. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
131. See Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Advisers Recommending Some 
Changes in Methodsfor TItle VI Complaint Analysis, 173 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) A-3 (Sept. 
8, 1998); Hogue, SAB Recommends Steps, supra note 122, at 1311 (reporting Science 
Advisory Board recommends EPA should determine the risk to all populations around a 
facility, minority or not, before conducting a disproportionate impact analysis). 
132. See generally Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 343 n.59, 390-92 & 
n.373 (discussing how use of different definitions of subpopulations or geographical areas 
can dramatically affect research results); Mohai, supra note 11, passim; Zimmerman, supra 
note 11, at 665-69 (same). 
133. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. 
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one cannot assume that its demographic or pollution information is 
accurate or complete. The EPA or recipient agencies should provide 
technical assistance and funding to complainants so that affected 
populations can understand the complex technical issues involved in 
most Title VI environmental justice cases. 134 
b. Mitigation 
If the EPA concludes that the recipient's action will result in 
disparate impacts, the recipient agency that awarded the permit may 
attempt to rebut the EPA's findings or contend that its action is 
justified by the proposal's net benefits; however, the EPA encourages 
measures that directly or indirectly mitigate any harms from such 
disparate impacts as the primary approach to addressing Title VI 
violations.I3S The EPA does not define when direct mitigation 
measures or indirect "supplemental mitigation projects" are 
appropriate to redress such harms, except to suggest that recipients 
consult with the agency. 136 
Civil rights groups are generally opposed to the EPA's policy of 
allowing mitigation measures to offset harms from disparate impacts, 
because they usually want to eliminate such impacts rather than to 
either reduce them or authorize the agency to count indirect benefits 
from supplemental environmental projects as compensation for such 
harms.137 ill Part V.B.2, I will demonstrate that the Interim Guidance 
fails to provide guarantees that recipients or permit applicants will 
actually implement promised mitigation measures. I will also examine 
the Interim Guidance's requirement that the recipient determine 
whether mitigation measures can serve as "less discriminatory 
alternatives.,,138 
c. Less Discriminatory Alternatives 
The Interim Guidance requires recipients to select a less 
discriminatory alternative if it is "equally effective" in addressing the 
permit applicant's goals, but fails to address how to evaluate 
alternatives, or which party has the burden ?f proof to establish the 
134. See infra Part V:B.3. 
135. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 5, 11-12. 
136. See id. at 11-12. 
137. See Angela M. Baggetta, Environmental Justice: Black Caucus, EPA to Meet on 
Shintech; Dispute May Be Test Case on Title VI Suits, 139 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) A-I (July 
21, 1998); Cole & Moore, supra note 120, at 14A. 
138. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 12. 
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existence or nonexistence of alternatives.139 The recipient should 
have the primary burden -of production and proof to establish that a 
less discriminatory alternative does not exist, but a complainant may 
have a responsibility in some cases to present a less discriminatory 
alternative that was not reasonably apparent to the recipient.140 
B. Improving Tztle VI: Require Recipients to Identify Less 
Discriminatory Alternatives, Implement Mitigation Measures, 
and Provide for Public Participation, with the EPA to Provide 
Technical Assistance 
The EPA should implement four major changes to improve the 
futerim Guidance. 141 First, the futerim Guidance should place the 
burden on the recipient to demonstrate that there are no less 
discriminatory alternatives that meet the applicant's reasonable 
business needs. Second, the EPA should require the recipient to 
establish that any mitigation measures will reduce any risks to 
surrounding populations, including minority groups protected by 
Title VI, to permissible levels and to examine whether such 
mitigation measures could be used at less discriminatory alternatives 
that meet the applicant's reasonable business needs. Third, the EPA 
or recipient should provide technical assistance to Title VI 
complainants, and should also provide technical assistance grants so 
that complainants can hire their own technical experts. Finally, 
recipients should adopt procedures to encourage early participation 
by affected populations, especially minority groups, to avoid 
controversies that lead to Title VI challenges. 
1. Proving That There Are No Less Discriminatory Alternatives 
Title VI cases have inappropriately followed Title vn law in 
placing the burdens of production and proof on plaintiffs to 
demonstrate that a less discriminatory alternative exists.142 fu Title 
VI cases, if a defendant offers a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
business or educational justification for its actions, most courts have 
not required the defendant to consider alternative proposals with less 
disparate impact. fustead, courts have placed the burden on the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that a defendant failed to adopt an alternative 
139. See generally id.; Gracer, supra note 117, at 10,375. 
140. See infra Part Y.B.1. 
141. See infra Part Y.C. 
142. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir. 
1993); Colopy, supra note 19, at 161-62 & nn.l63-66; Hampton, supra note 60, at 553. 
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practice with less discriminatory effect that would have met the 
defendant's legitimate business objectives.143 According to Title VI 
case law, if a defendant does present evidence that it chose the least 
discriminatory alternative, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
defendant in fact did not do SO.I44 Title VI case law suggests that a 
plaintiff must present a concrete alternative, rather than merely 
speculate that such an alternative might exist. 145 
Some commentators have argued that importing Title VII's 
restrictive evidentiary standards into Title VI cases is unnecessary and 
even contrary to the spirit of the latter statute because Title VII applies 
to the private labor market, where there is a presumption of 
employment at will.146 Title VI pertains only to those parties who 
voluntarily accept federal aid.147 Furthennore, Title VII explicitly 
acknowledges that defendants have affinnative defenses that may 
justify disparate impacts and that employers do not have to hire either 
women or minorities to precisely reflect their percentage of the 
population.148 
There is an even stronger argument that Title VII should not 
serve as the evidentiary model for Title VI in addressing the question 
of less discriminatory alternatives. Title VII cases have emphasized 
that it is appropriate to place the burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate 
the existence of less discriminatory alternatives because placing an 
affinnative burden on defendants to prove that there is no less 
discriminatory alternative would interfere too much with private labor 
markets. ''Because the courts are 'generally less competent than 
employers to restructure business practice,' the courts should be 
143. See generally Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407; NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 
657 F.2d 1322, 1336 (3d Cir. 1981); Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 618-19 (2d Cir. 1980); 
Colopy, supra note 19, at 161-63 & n.163; Hampton, supra note 60, at 531,553; see also 
Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against I-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 128 (S.D. Ohio 
1984) (questioning but not deciding the plaintiff's assertion that defendant had duty under 
Title VI to discuss alternatives with less disparate impact). 
144. See Wilmington Med. Ctr., 657 F.2d at 1336-37 (requiring plaintiffs to 
demonstrate that feasible, less discriminatory alternatives exist if defendant provides 
reasonable justification for its actions, and suggesting that district court's "stringent standard" 
of requiring defendant to produce evidence that it had chosen least discriminatory alternative 
goes beyond Title VI's standard); Colopy, supra note 19, at 161-62 n.163. 
145. See Coalition of Concerned Citizens, 608 F. Supp. at 128 (stating that plaintiff 
must present concrete, reasonable alternative sites); Been, Equity Issues, supra note 59, 
§ 25D.04[3][g][iii], at 98-100 (arguing that environmental justice plaintiffs in Title VI actions 
should be prepared to demonstrate availability of alternative sites); Fisher, supra note 13, at 
326-28 (same); Hammer, supra note 26, at 708-09 (same). 
146. See Watson, supra note 30, at 971-73. 
147. See Fisher, supra note 13, at 320; Soon, supra note 77, at 1596 n.92; Watson, 
supra note 30, at 971-73. 
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2G) (1997). 
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cautious in requiring that an employer adopt [ alternative] practices 
recommended by the plaintiff in such a context.,,149 However, as Title 
VI recipients usually have greater expertise than complainants and 
have voluntarily accepted federal assistance, it is appropriate to place 
at least a limited burden on recipients to show no less discriminatory 
alternatives exist without interfering with recipient's legitimate 
policymaking discretion. 
fustead of following Title VII and VI case law, the EPA should 
place a limited burden of production and proof on the recipient 
permitting agency, and indirectly on the permit applicant, to 
demonstrate that there are no less discriminatory alternatives that meet 
the applicant's reasonable business needs. ISO Furthermore, the futerim 
Guidance's requirement that an alternative be "equally effective" 
makes it too easy for a permitting agency and permittee to use minor 
advantages to prefer their proposal to a reasonably effective 
alternative. IS 1 Thus, the EPA should simply require that an alternative 
is "comparably effective" or reasonably similar in meeting any 
legitimate business needs of the permit applicant. On the other hand, it 
is more difficult in the context of Title VI siting challenges to limit cost 
or safety factors than it is in the case of Title VII claims alleging 
intentional gender discrimination. Accordingly, the defendant should 
be able to reject alternative sites that are significantly more expensive 
or less safe than the proposed site. 
a The futerim Guidance Is Unclear 
The Interim Guidance does not clearly specify whether the 
complainant has the burden of proving that less discriminatory 
alternatives exist or whether the recipient must show that such 
alternatives do not exist. The futerim Guidance simply states that "a 
justification offered will not be considered acceptable if it is shown 
that a less discriminatory alternative exists."ls2 
At least one commentator has suggested that the futerim 
Guidance violates Title VI case law by improperly placing the burden 
on the defendant recipient to demonstrate that no less discriminatory 
149. Stutts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 855 F. Supp. 1574, 1580 (N.D. Ala 1994) 
(quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonia, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989); Fumco Constr. Corp. 
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978»; Mahoney, supra note 56, at 488. 
150. See generally Watson, supra note 30, at 977 (arguing that in Title VI cases 
involving health care discrimination, "health care defendant[ s] should bear the risk of non-
persuasion on both the important, legitimate business objective and the less discriminatory 
alternatives''); Hampton, supra note 60, at 553. 
151. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 12. 
152. ld. 
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alternative exists rather than to simply provide a legitimate business 
justification for a decision.153 In addition, while Title VI case law 
requires a plaintiff to show that a less discriminatory alternative will 
serve the defendant's legitimate business interests, the Interim 
Guidance arguably does not require a complainant to establish that 
such an alternative would reasonably meet the defendant's appropriate 
needs. 154 
On the other hand, the Interim Guidance states that an alternative 
must be "equally effective" in relation to the proposed facility. 155 The 
"equally effective" standard arguably places the burden of proof on the 
complainant to demonstrate that any alternatives it proffers are equally 
as good as the challenged proposal. 
When it promulgates its final Title VI interim guidance, the EPA 
should clearly specify the extent to which either the complainant or 
recipient has the burden of production or proof as to whether a less 
discriminatory alternative exists. Furthermore, EPA should not follow 
Title VI and VII case law, which places the burdens of production and 
proof on the plaintiff to establish that a less discriminatory alternative 
exists and would reasonably meet the defendant's legitimate business 
goals, and should instead place those burdens on the recipient. 
b. Defendant's Burden to Demonstrate No Less 
Discriminatory Alternatives 
The recipient permitting agency and, indirectly, the permit 
applicant, should have a limited· burden of production and the 
ultimate burden of proof to demonstrate that there are no less 
discriminatory alternatives. The proposal goes beyond existing Title 
VI case law, but the EPA has the authority under section 602 to 
promulgate implementing regulations that go beyond section 601, 
and has already done so by adopting a disparate impact standard 
rather than requiring proof of discriminatory intent.156 Recipient 
agencies and permittees generally have greater resources and 
expertise than complainants to investigate alternative sites.157 In 
addition, it is appropriate to place the burden of examining 
153. See Gracer, supra note 117, at 10,375. 
154. Seeid. 
155. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
157. See generally NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1355 (3d 
Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that defendant 
health care organizations generally have more expertise than plaintiffs to formulate less 
discriminatory alternatives regarding the location of health care facilities); Watson, supra 
note 30, at 977 (same); Hampton, supra note 60, at 553 (same). 
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alternatives on the recipient, because it has benefited from an EPA 
grant that requires it not to engage in actions that cause disparate 
impacts.158 Furthermore, the EPA's administrative process provides 
few rights for complainants to participate in the investigation of a 
complaint, but provides substantial appeal rights to recipients found 
guilty of a violation. Therefore, it is reasonable to place the ultimate 
burdens of production and proof in that process on the recipient, even 
if it arguably would not be fair to do so in a lawsuit in which the 
defendant does not enjoy such procedural protections. 
fu many cases, the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA),1S9 state mini-NEPAs, or substantive environmental statutes 
require the agency to consider alternative sites or plans.160 Building 
upon this NEPA precedent, this Article proposes to interpret Title VI to 
require the recipient to adopt the least discriminatory alternative that 
reasonably serves the legitimate business needs of the recipient or 
permit applicant.161 
Even though the recipient would have the burdens of production 
and proof to demonstrate that no less discriminatory alternative than 
the chosen site exists, the EPA should try to limit the cost of those 
burdens as much as possible without harming the legitimate concerns 
of the complainant. Conducting such investigations of alternative sites 
is less burdensome than it might seem at first because recipient 
agencies and permit applicants are often required by the recipient's 
permitting and siting rules to compile a list of several potential sites 
and to rank them before making a final selection.162 While plaintiffs 
could use the recipient's list to point out alternatives, the recipient and 
permit applicant are likely to understand better the strengths and 
IS8. See Watson, supra note 30, at 977 (arguing that burden of proof should be on 
recipient because it has accepted federal grant money). 
IS9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1997). 
160. See § 4332(2)(C)(iii); 40 C.F.R. § IS02.14 (1997); 33 C.F.R. § 230.10 (1998); 
Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and 
"Justice",47 AM. U. L. REv. 221, 293 n.3S8 (1997) (listing thirteen states and Puerto Rico 
as having state statutes or regulations based on NEPA that require agency to consider 
alternatives). 
161. See 40 C.F.R. § IS0S.2 (1997) (requiring that fmal ROD (record of decision) 
discuss why proposal was selected in preference to alternatives); Kaswan, supra note 160, at 
294; Stephen M. Johnson, NEPA and SEPAs in the Quest/or Environmental Justice, 30 Loy. 
L.A. L. REv. 56S, 577 (1997) (determining that NEPA requires identification of alternatives, 
but does not require agency to select least environmentally damaging alternative); see also 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116D.04(6) (West 1997) (requiring state to adopt feasible and prudent 
alternative that is less environmentally destructive). 
162. See Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 34S-S1 (discussing various 
state siting processes); Colopy, supra note 19, at 163 n.l69 (determining that some 
defendants in siting cases have chosen from a list of potential sites). 
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weaknesses of potential sites because they have compiled the list; 
therefore, the burden should be on the recipient to explain whether 
other sites on the list would have less discriminatory impact and to 
what extent other sites could meet the applicant's legitimate business 
needs. Accordingly, recipients should have the burden of production 
and proofto consider alternative sites. 
While the burden of production and proof should be on recipient 
agencies to examine alternative sites, the EPA could place reasonable 
limits on the range of alternative sites that a recipient must consider. 
In Title VI cases involving the siting of public facilities, courts have 
been reluctant to consider alternatives that require substantial 
modification of the defendant's goals because of the risk that the 
judiciary would exceed its constitutional role by inappropriately 
substituting its policy choices in place of those of elected and 
appointed officials.163 The EPA is not bound by the same Article ill 
limitations as courts in enforcing Title VI, but the broad criticism of 
the Interim Guidance by state and local officials across the nation 
suggests that the EPA must be cautious about interfering too much 
with the policy choices of state or local recipient agencies, or face 
strong criticism that its policies are hampering economic 
development.l64 
As a practical political matter, the EPA's Title VI policy probably 
should follow case law in limiting the range of alternatives that a 
recipient must consider. For example, a recipient would not have to 
consider alternatives that would involve a significant change in the 
permit applicant's legitimate business goals. On the other hand, as 
will be explained below, the appropriate question should be whether an 
alternative is "comparably effective" rather than whether it is "equally 
effective.,,165 A recipient should not use minor differences to reject a 
less discriminatory alternative that can meet its legitimate business 
needs. 
In addition, a recipient should not have to disprove every possible 
alternative, but only reasonably apparent alternatives.166 Such a 
163. See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612,619 (2d Cir. 1980) (warning, in Title VI case, 
that court should require plaintiffs to focus on comparable alternatives and not consider 
alternatives based on significantly different policy choices because of danger court would 
substitute its policy judgments for elected and appointed officials); Been, Equity Issues, supra 
note 59, § 25D.04[3)[g)[iii), at 99-100. 
164. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text. 
165. See infra. 
166. See generally Watson, supra note 30, at 977 (arguing that in Title VI cases 
involving health care discrimination, health care defendants should have a duty to examine 
reasonable alternatives, but not to "disprove every conceivable alternative"). 
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limitation is consistent with Title VII's requirement that a defendant 
may be held liable only if it refuses to implement a less discriminatory 
alternative.167 A recipient should not be held in violation of Title VI if 
it did not know or should have known about the existence of a less 
discriminatory alternative. 
In NEPA cases, if a complainant simply submits a long "laundry 
lisf' of conceivable alternatives, a court may apply a "rule of reason" 
and refuse to require an agency to conduct an expensive or intensive 
investigation of every possible alternative.168 Applying such a "rule of 
reason," the Supreme Court, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., concluded that even 
though agencies have a duty under NEPA to examine alternatives, 
agencies are not required to examine every alternative raised; they 
may require an intervenor to show why an alternative merits further 
study.169 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission had not required the 
complainants even to establish a prima facie case that an alternative 
was effective, but merely asked the complainant to make a sufficient 
showing that energy conservation and other suggested alternatives 
were worth further study and examinationYo A majority of NEPA 
cases place the burden of proof on the plaintiff to demonstrate that an 
agency's Environmental Impact Statement (ElS) is inadequate,111 and 
167. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text 
168. See Vennont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 552-53 (1978) (concluding that, where complainant submitted 
long list of altematives, including "energy conservation," agency did not have obligation to 
investigate every single altemative raised, but only to explore relatively apparent altematives 
or alternatives that complainant had explained in sufficient detail); Fayetteville Area 
Chamber of Commerce v. Volpe, 515 F.2d 1021, 1027 (4th Cir. 1975) (applying "rule of 
reason" standard to limit agency's consideration of altematives in preparing Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS»; Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 
836-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating that agency's discussion of altematives in an EIS was 
govemed by rule of reason); Council on Environmental Quality, Forty Most Asked Questions 
Conceming CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, Question 16,46 Fed. 
Reg. 18,026, 18,037 (1981) (stating that if "a very large number of altematives" are 
potentially available, agency may limit consideration to a ''reasonable number" as long as 
agency evaluates an adequate range of altematives); DANIEL R. MANoELKER, NEPA LAW 
AND LmGATION § 9.05[2], [3] (1992 & Supp. 1998) (discussing Morton and Vermont 
Yankee); id. § 10.09[4] n.36 (listing cases applying "rule of reason"). 
169. 435 U.S. at 552-54 (stating that petitioner has duty under NEPA and basic 
principles of administrative law to raise issues before agency rather than engage in trial by 
ambush and that agency only has duty to explore relatively apparent altematives). 
170. See id.; MANoELKER, supra note 168, § 9.05[3] (discussing Vermont Yankee). 
171. See MANoELKER, supra note 168, § 4.09[8] n.l43 (listing cases). 
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some courts have required plaintiffs to demonstrate that their proposed 
alternatives are reasonable and feasible.172 
Arguably, cases such as Vermont Yankee place too heavy a 
burden on environmental groups to introduce evidence that challenges 
an agency's findings or methodology. Environmental groups' 
resources to investigate alternatives are usually far more limited then 
those of agencies. The proposal173 to provide technical assistance 
grants to such groups would at best prov.ide only very limited 
resources for them to examine alternatives. On the other hand, 
complainants should not simply submit a long list of alternatives to an 
agency and then refuse to participate in the internal hearing process, as 
did the petitioners in Vermont Yankee. 174 
Because recipient state or local permitting agencies generally 
possess greater resources and expertise than complainants, the EPA 
should not place the burden of proof on complainants to demonstrate 
that a proposed alternative is equally or even comparably effective to 
the proposal. However, the EPA may require that a complainant 
demonstrate that during the public comment period of the permitting 
process it presented a proposed less discriminatory alternative that the 
recipient unreasonably failed to investigate further or that the recipient 
failed to adequately consider reasonably apparent alternative sites. 
Once a complainant has sufficiently identified a less discriminatory 
,alternative and provided a plausible suggestion for why it might be 
reasonably effective, then the burden of production and proof would 
shift back to the recipient to explain why that alternative is less 
acceptable than the proposed facility. The ultimate burden of 
production and proof should be on the recipient, because it usually has 
greater expertise than most complainants, and because it has benefited 
from a federal grant. 175 Nevertheless, a complainant should, to the 
extent possible, raise specific alternatives so that a recipient can 
efficiently respond to those charges without engaging ill an 
unnecessarily expensive and open ended investigation. 
c. ''Equally Effective" Alternatives 
Title vn cases have generally adopted Wards Cove's standard 
that plaintiffs must prove that an alternative would be equally 
172. See Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against I-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 
128 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (quoting Citizens Committee Against Interstate Route 675 v. Lewis, 
542 F. Supp. 496, 522 (S.D. Ohio 1982)); Colopy, supra note 19, at 163 n.l69. 
173. See infra Part V.B.3. 
174. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 552-53. 
175. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
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effective, would have less disproportionate effect, and would not cost 
significantly more.176 At least one recent Title VII case has required 
the plaintiff to show that a less discriminatory alternative is 
"comparably effective."177 Title VI case law is even less clear about 
whether a plaintiff must prove that a less discriminatory alternative is 
"equally effective,,178 or only ''that there exists a comparably 
effective alternative practice which would result in less 
disproportionality."179 
The EPA has adopted the "equally effective" standard in its 
Interim Guidance, but does not explain when an alternative should be 
considered "equally effective.,,18o The "equally effective" standard 
makes it too easy for defendants to use minor differences to reject 
reasonably good sites. Instead, the EPA should require a recipient to 
adopt a less discriminatory alternative that is "comparably 
effective.,,181 The EPA should not allow defendants to impose criteria 
that artificially exclude reasonably effective alternative sites in areas 
with lower minority populations. In particular, the EPA should require 
a recipient to implement a less discriminatory alternative unless the 
recipient can demonstrate that it is significantly more expensive, less 
efficient, or less safe than a more discriminatory challenged proposal. 
d. Cost as a Factor 
A difficult issue concerns the extent to which a recipient agency 
may use cost as a justification to exclude less discriminatory 
alternatives on the grounds that the proposed site is less expensive 
than any alternative site. Following Wards Cove, Title VII cases 
generally require plaintiffs to demonstrate that an alternative is 
"equally effective" by showing that a less discriminatory alternative 
176. See York v. AT&T, 95 F.3d 948, 955 (10th Cir. 1996); MacPherson v. University 
of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 771 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 661 (1989)); Mahoney, supra note 56, at 486-89. 
177. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1121 (11th Cir. 1993). 
178. See Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 
1417 (11th Cir. 1985). 
179. Elston v. Talladega County Bd. ofEduc., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11 th Cir. 1993). 
180. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 12. 
181. See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407 (stating that alternative must be "comparably 
effective''); Coalition of Concerned Citizens, 608 F. Supp. at 128 (stating that plaintiff must 
present concrete alternative sites); see also Been, Equity Issues, supra note 59, 
§ 25D.04[3][g][iii], at 98-100 (arguing that environmental justice plaintiff in Title VI action 
should be prepared to demonstrate availability of alternative sites); Fisher, supra note 13, at 
321 (same); Hammer, supra note 26, at 708-09 (same). 
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would not cost significantly more than the challenged policy.182 
Similarly, in Title VI cases challenging allegedly discriminatory 
hospital closings or relocations, courts have allowed defendants to 
demonstrate that their proposals would save more money than less 
discriminatory alternatives. 183 
If a low-income minority group lives in an area with significantly 
lower land prices, a recipient may argue that such lower land prices are 
a substantial business reason for selecting a site and, accordingly, that 
any disparate impacts on minority groups are justified.184 Because 
minority groups, on average, have lower incomes than whites and, as a 
result, often live in areas with lower land prices, allowing recipients 
and developers to use lower costs as a justification may place many 
minorities at risk. 185 
Some commentators have argued that only extraordinary costs 
that would put an employer out of business should be a defense in 
Title VII employment cases; society should require employers to bear 
the costs associated with achieving racial or gender equality unless 
these costs are so great that a business could not operate if it, for 
instance, hires female workers.186 In Title VII cases alleging disparate 
treatment or intentional discrimination, the Supreme Court has 
generally rejected the defense of increased cost when raised as a bona 
fide occupational qualification for not hiring women or charging them 
larger pension contributions, unless such costs would be so great that 
182. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 661 (1989) (stating that 
"[fJactors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative selection devices are 
relevant in determining whether they would be equally as effective as the challenged practice 
in serving the employer's legitimate business goals'') (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & 
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988) (plurality opinion)); EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 969 F. 
Supp. 727, 740 (S.D. Fla 1997) (citing Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661); Rudder v. District of 
Columbia, 890 F. Supp. 23, 46 (D.D.C. 1995) (same), aff'd, 99 F.3d 448 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 
Stutts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 855 F. Supp. 1574, 1581 (N.D. Ala 1994) (same); Mahoney, 
supra note 56, at 488-89 & n.305 (citing and quoting cases). 
183. See NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 316, 339-40, 342 
(D. Del. 1980) (finding that cost justified hospital relocation in Title VI case), aff'd, 657 F.2d 
1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc); Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) 
(same), aff'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980); Been, Equity Issues, supra note 59, 
§ 25D.04[3][g][ii][A], at 92-94 (citing cases); Watson, supra note 30, at 966-69; see also 
Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 905 (B.D. Mo. 1979) (denying preliminary injunction 
against closing and consolidation of hospital services based on cost savings of$7 million per 
year in Title VI case), aff'd, 620 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1980). 
184. See Centner et al., supra note 67, at 140. 
185. See generally Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 12, at 1392-97 (suggesting 
that environmental disparities are often largely the result of income rather than primarily 
caused by race). 
186., See Grover, supra note 69, at 398 n.40; Note, Less Discriminatory Alternatives, 
supra note 100, at 1629-31. 
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an industry could not bear them.187 On the other hand, in Title VII 
cases not involving intentional sex discrimination, courts generally 
allow significant cost differences to serve as a justification for 
discriminatory practices.188 
While prohibiting defendants from raising costs as a defense 
unless those costs are of extraordinary magnitude would provide 
greater protection to minorities by forcing recipients to use more 
expensive alternative sites, such a policy might discourage any 
economic development in minority areas, including redevelopment of 
brownfields. Instead of prohibiting cost defenses, the EPA should 
simply place the burden on the recipient rather than the complainant to 
demonstrate that any alternative site would be significantly more 
expensive and that the added cost would make it substantially more 
difficult to achieve the permit applicant's legitimate business goals. 
It would be more difficult to disallow totally cost as a justification 
in Title VI siting cases than Title VII employment discrimination 
actions. Courts can require all employers in an industry to bear, for 
instance, the costs of sex equality.189 Such cost equalization is more 
difficult in the context of environmental siting because it is impractical 
to close existing facilities that have already benefited from lower land 
costs. Furthermore, because land prices vary significantly from 
location to location, it is difficult to say when discrimination may have 
influenced the value of land or the number of minorities in an area. A 
blanket rule that developers cannot locate where land is cheap if there 
are significant numbers of minorities in an area would discourage 
economic development or redevelopment in minority areas. Many 
mayors have criticized the Interim Guidance because it might 
discourage development of brownfields, and they would certainty 
oppose an explicit policy against development in low-cost minority 
areas.190 
187. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-211 
(1991) (rejecting increased cost and reproductive safety as justifications for not hiring 
women); City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-18 & n.32 
(1978) (holding under Title VII that increased cost of providing pensions to women does not 
justify sex discrimination); Note, Less Discriminatory AlternatiVes, supra note 100, at 1628-
31. 
188. See supra notes 182-183 and accompanying text 
189. See Note, Less Discriminatory Alternatives, supra note 100, at 1633-34 
("Provided that courts impose restructuring on all employers equally, no disadvantage will 
attach to any individual business."). However, it may be more difficult for industries 
involved in intemational competition to pass on costs, but Congress has rejected that 
argument by extending employment discrimination law extraterritorially. See id. at 1634; 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 109,42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
190. See Conference of Mayors, supra note 118, at 469. 
HeinOnline -- 73 Tul. L. Rev. 826 1998-1999
826 TULANE LAW REVIEW [VoL 73 :787 
Even if it is not possible to prohibit totally the consideration of 
cost as a justification for selecting a site in a heavily minority area, an 
improved interim guidance on Title VI could require the pennitting 
agency and pennittee to demonstrate that the selected site is 
significantly less expensive than any less discriminatory alternative.191 
Some Title VII cases have suggested £lat Wards Cove's "equally 
effective" standard means that a plaintiff must show that an alternative 
is not significantly more expensive, not that the costs must be exactly 
the same.192 If costs are roughly the same, the EPA should not allow 
recipients to use insignificant cost differences as a pretext to justify the 
selection of a site for unspoken discriminatory reasons, including that 
the minority community may have less political clout to block a 
proposal than a nonminority community. However, if there are some 
cost differences between a minority site and a less discriminatory 
alternative, it may be difficult to challenge a pennittee's assertion that 
such a difference would affect its ability to compete even if that claim 
is a pretext for hidden discriminatory motives. Still, placing the 
burden on the permitting agency and pennittee to show that the 
selected site is significantly less expensive than any less discriminatory 
alternative should discourage blatantly discriminatory efforts to pick 
minority communities because they are politically weaker than 
comparable alternative areas. 
e. Safety as a Justification 
In Title VII cases, the Supreme Court has usually allowed safety 
or efficiency considerations to serve as legitimate business 
justifications for discriminatory practices,193 but has rejected the 
defense of reproductive safety when raised as a bona fide 
occupational qualification for not hiring women.194 Courts in Title 
VI cases involving hospital consolidations or relocations have 
allowed defendants to justify moves to areas with lower minority 
populations because the defendant's previously fragmented facilities 
contributed to serious problems in the quality of care, and 
191. See Watson, supra note 30, at 977 (arguing that "[aJ more costly less 
discriminatory alternative is acceptable as long as the cost differential is not too substantial"). 
192. See Nash v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 895 F. Supp. 1536, 1553 (M.D. 
Fla 1995) (ruling that the plaintiff failed to present alternatives that did not involve "greatly 
increased costs"); Mahoney, supra note 56, at 488-89 & n.305 (citing and quoting cases); see 
also Allen v. District of Columbia, 812 F. Supp. 1239, 1245 (D.D.C. 1993) (stating that less 
discriminatory alternative must be "both possible and practical"). 
193. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text 
194. See supra notes 103 and accompanying text. 
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consolidation or relocation would significantly improve care. 195 
Similarly, Title VI defendants in environmental siting cases are likely 
to argue that safety, geology, or transportation convenience justify the 
selection of a site in a minority area.196 
The EPA should place the burden on the recipient to show that 
less discriminatory sites would be significantly less safe or efficient 
than the challenged proposal. While it is more difficult to reject safety 
as a justification in Title VI siting cases than in Title VII employment 
discrimination actions, the EPA should ensure that comparable less 
discriminatory sites do not exist that would provide similar 
advantages. Women who are capable of bearing children should have 
the option of working in industries where there are unavoidable 
reproductive risks, even if the employer reasonably fears increased 
medical costs or liability risks. The Supreme Court has recognized 
reproductive choice as an important value, and excluding women from 
suchjobs would significantly hinder their employment opportunities in 
violation of Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act. 197 
195. See NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 316, 341-42 (D. 
Del. 1980) (finding, in Title VI case, that quality and efficiency of consolidation justified 
hospital relocation and consolidation where hospital could show the change was "essential" 
to maintain high quality care and to avoid losing accreditation because previously fragmented 
facilities contributed to serious problems in the quality of care), aff'd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 
1981) (en banc); United States v. Bexar County, 484 F. Supp. 855, 859 (W.D. Tex. 1980) 
(stating that transportation problems caused by relocation would be outweighed by quality 
concerns); Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 904-905 (B.D. Mo. 1979) (finding that 
efficiency, including occupancy rates, and quality concerns, such as number of life support 
units and medical school access, justified relocation), aff'd, 620 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1980); 
Been, Equity Issues, supra note 59, § 25D.04[3][g][ii][A], at 92-94 (citing cases); Watson, 
supra note 30, at 966-69; Hampton, supra note 60, at 536-42. 
196. See, e.g., Joan Z. Bernstein, The Siting of Commercial Waste Facilities: An 
Evolution of Community Land Use DecisiOns, 1 KAN. IL. & PUB. POL'y 83, 84 (1991) ("The 
waste industry's criteria for identifying attractive sites has evolved over the last several 
decades, from considerations that were primarily financial to considerations that reflect the 
priority of protecting human health and the environment''); Charles J. McDermott, 
Balancing the Scales of Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.I 689, 697 (1994) 
(arguing that WMX's Emelle landfill in predominantly African-American Sumter County, 
Alabama was chosen because of good transportation, its aridity, sparse population, and "most 
importantly, [because it] was located atop the 'Selma chalk formation",); Jane Seigler, 
Environmental Justice: An Industry Perspective, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 59 
(1993-94) (same). But see Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The Questfor Environmental 
Justice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 729 (1993) [hereinafter Foster, Race(ial) Matters] (criticizing 
use of race-neutral grounds by private industry and suggesting they may be cover for racism); 
Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 398-424 (arguing that current siting schemes 
may under protect the most vulnerable populations living near a proposed facility). 
197. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-207 
(1991) (rejecting reproductive safety as justification for not hiring women). 
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On the other hand, if a developer legitimately demonstrates that a 
minority site is safer than any less discriminatory alternative because, 
for example, there are unique geological fonnations in the minority 
area that inhibit spills from reaching underground aquifers, then such a 
justification should be allowed.198 There is no reason to believe that 
minority areas are disproportionately safer than majority areas. 
Indeed, to the extent that discriminatory siting has occurred in the past 
in areas such as Louisiana's "cancer alley,,,199 a policy focusing on 
safety should benefit minority groups more than hurt them. 
Nevertheless, the pennitting agency and pennittee should bear the 
burden of establishing that safety concerns are not a pretext to justify 
the selection of a site for unspoken discriminatory reasons. 
2. Requiring Legitimate Mitigation Measures 
The Congressional Black Caucus and environmental justice 
advocates have argued that the Interim Guidance is inconsistent with 
Title VI case law because it allows mitigation measures to be used to 
justify a project that would otherwise pose unacceptable risks to 
groups protected under the statute?OO While their fear that mitigation 
measures will be used to legitimate otherwise unacceptable projects 
raises genuine concerns, a total prohibition on considering mitigation 
measures is probably unrealistic. Instead, the pennitting agency and 
pennittee should bear the burden of establishing that any mitigation 
measures used to reduce disparate impacts to an acceptable level will 
in fact work, and will reduce any risks to surrounding populations, 
including minority groups protected by Title VI, to pennissible 
levels. Moreover, the pennitting agency and pennittee should have 
the burden of examining whether such mitigation measures could be 
198. See Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 398-99 (discussing industry's 
argument that Emelle Landfill was located in heavily minority Sumter County, Alabama, not 
because of race, but because Selma chalk formation provides 700-foot barrier from the 
nearest aquifer); McDermott, supra note 196, at 697 (same). But see Foster, Race(ial) 
Matters, supra note 196, at 729 (suggesting that private industry's use of race-neutral grounds 
may be cover for racism). 
199. The term "cancer alley" refers to the approximately 85-mile corridor from Baton 
Rouge to New Orleans, Louisiana, which contains numerous petrochemical facilities and a 
large minority population. See Saleem, supra note 25, at 230 n.80 (discussing high level of 
pollution and substantial minority population in St James Parish, Louisiana). But see 
CHRISTOPHER FOREMAN, THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 75-76 (1998) 
(observing that there are high levels of pollution and substantial minority populations in the 
so-called "cancer alley" area, but arguing that a recent study did not fmd elevated cancer rates 
in that area). 
200. See Baggetta, supra note 137, at A-I. 
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used in conjunction with less discriminatory alternatives that meet 
the applicant's reasonable business needs. 
It could be argued that, if a project would pose unacceptable risks 
to any population group, including minority and ethnic groups 
protected by Title VI, mitigation measures should not be used to 
justify such a project, because there are usually no guarantees that such 
mitigation will work. On the other hand, if there are effective 
mitigation measures available, such as the placement of a buffer zone 
around a polluting facility to keep any harmful effects from 
surrounding population201 or the provision of enhanced fire fighting 
equipment to address any increased risk of fires,2°2 then it is 
unreasonable to simply ignore actions that reduce risks. 
In other areas of environmental law, it is common to consider 
mitigative procedures. The NEPA requires federal agencies, state or 
local governments that receive substantial federal financial assistance 
for a project, or certain federal permit applicants to prepare an EIS for 
"major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment,,,203 or to issue a finding of no significant impact 
(FONSI)?04 NEPA does not require that agencies or private applicants 
actually implement mitigation measures, but the lead agency must 
discuss how such measures could minimize any environmental 
impacts.205 
201. See Bradford C. Mank, Preventing Bhopal: "Dead Zones" and Toxic Death Risk 
Index Taxes, 53 OInO ST. LJ. 761, 776-78 (1992). 
202. Bradford C. Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon of Siting and Cleaning Up 
Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or Met/iation Slay the Monster?, 19 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 239, 272-74,276 (l991-92). 
203. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1997). To detennine whether a proposed action is a 
"major Federal actionO significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" 
requiring an EIS, agencies draft an Environmental Assessment (EA) that examines the need 
for the project, considers alternatives to the proposal, discusses the impacts of the proposal 
and any alternatives, and may discuss mitigation measures. See Valerie M. Fogleman, 
Environmental Impact Statements, in 1 ENvIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE: STATE AND 
FEDERAL LAW § 1.07 (Michael Gerrard ed. 1997); Johnson, supra note 161, at 570. If a 
permit application by a private party requires an EIS, the permitting agency must draft the 
EIS, but may collaborate with the applicant. See Fogleman, supra, § 1.09[2][c], at 60. A 
state agency, however, may draft an EIS when the proposed action is federally funded. See 
id. 
204. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1997); MANDELKER, supra note 168, § 8.08[2], [3] 
(discussing cases upholding or rejecting a finding of no significant impact). 
205. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(h) (l997); see also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens 
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352-53 (l989); MANDELKER, supra note 168, § 8.08[10] n.76. A few 
states require agencies to implement feasible mitigation measures or alternatives. See CAL. 
PUB. REs. CODE § 21002.1(b) (Deering 1996) (requiring state agencies to mitigate or avoid 
significant environmental impacts if "feasible''); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116D.04(6) (West 
1997) (requiring state to adopt feasible and prudent alternative that is less environmentally 
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Courts have held and the White House Council on 
Environmental Quality has suggested that agencies, sometimes 
working in collaboration with private applicants, may avoid preparing 
an EIS by mitigating the impacts of their projects in the planning 
stages and then preparing a mitigated FONSI that relies on the 
mitigation measures to bring any adverse effects from the project 
below the level of "significance" triggering an EIS.206 Also, in an 
attempt to achieve a national goal of "no net loss" of wetlands, the 
Army Corps of Engineers frequently requires mitigation measures as a 
condition for obtaining a wetlands permit.207 
While some environmentalists, as a matter of principle, would 
not allow mitigation measures to justify an otherwise unacceptable 
project, it does not make sense to ignore the fact that effective 
mitigation measures can reduce or eliminate a project's impacts. 
Environmentalists' have, however, raised two important questions 
about when it'is appropriate to use mitigation measures to justify a 
project. First, mitigation measures should be enforceable, rather than 
mere promises made to be broken. There has been some question 
about whether and to what extent courts will enforce mitigation 
promises, by either government or private project sponsors, that are 
used to justify a mitigated FONSI, especially once the sponsor 
completes the project?°8 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit has held that mitigation promises by third parties not 
responsible for an environmental assessment "must be more than mere 
destructive); N.Y. ENvrL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1) (McKinney 1997) (requiring 
mitigation to maximum extent practicable); Johnson, supra note 161, at 597-99. 
206. See Preserve Endangered Areas of Cobb's Histol)', Inc. v. United States Army 
Corps of Eng'rs, 87 F.3d 1242, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 1996); Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 
F.3d 1324, 1327-29 (9th Cir. 1992); Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak 
Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 681-83 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Council on Environmental 
Quality, supra note 168, at Question 39, 18,037; MANDELKER, supra note 168, § 8.08[10]; 
Fogleman, supra note 203, § 1.07[3]; Albert I. Herson, Project Mitigation Revisited: Most 
Courts Approve Findings of No Significant Impact Justified by Mitigation, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
51,69 (1986); Johnson, supra note 161, at 576; Thomas O. McGarity, Judicial Enforcement 
ofNEPA-Inspired Promises, 20 ENvrL. L. 569, 577-91 (1990). 
207. See 40 C.F.R § 230.IO(d) (1997) (requiring compensatol)' mitigation in 
appropriate circumstances); 33 C.F.R § 320.4(r) (1998); Memorandum of Agreement 
Between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the Army Concerning 
the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 55 
Fed. Reg. 9,211 (1990) [hereinafter Mitigation MOA]; see also Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 
800 F.2d 822, 837-38 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding mitigation through off-site purchase of 
wetlands); MANDELKER, supra note 168, § 8.08[10]; Marc R Bulson, Off-Site Mitigation and 
the EIS Threshold: NEPA's Faulty Framework, 41 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 101, 
105-07 (1992). 
208. See McGarity, supra note 206, at 580. 
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vague statements of good intentions.,,209 On the other hand, once a 
project is largely or wholly completed, a court may be reluctant to 
issue an injunction to prevent operation of a project unless the sponsor 
has "hlatant[ly]" intended to violate NEPA and there is irreparable 
harm to the public interest that outweighs the benefits of the project.2IO 
Second, one must consider the issue of how closely related to a 
project mitigation measures must be to be acceptable. For example, 
the Army Corps of Engineers prefers on-site or in-kind wetlands 
mitigation, but allows the use of off-site mitigation, including cash 
payments to large wetlands ''banks''?l1 Environmentalists frequently 
argue that only mitigation measures directly related to a project should 
count because there is often a danger that off-site mitigation measures 
will not adequately compensate for a project's impacts.212 Most courts, 
however, have allowed agencies to use off-site mitigation measures to 
compensate for a project's impacts.213 The EPA has increasingly 
encouraged defendants owing civil penalties to consider supplemental 
environmental projects (SEPs) in lieu of paying monetary penalties to 
the United States Treasury.214 Moreover, penalties in citizen suits have 
often included such projects.215 
209. Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 860 (9th Cir. 1982). 
210. See Richland Park Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935, 942 (5th Cir. 
1982) (holding that the plaintiffs' NEPA claims were moot even though the agency failed to 
prepare special "environmental clearance" required by the agency's own regulations because 
NEPA is forward-looking statute that does not apply when project is completed unless 
agency has committed a ''blatant'' NEPA violation and caused irreparable harm to public 
interest); McGarity, supra note 206, at 580-83. 
211. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.1O(d) (1997) (requiring compensatory mitigation in 
appropriate circumstances); President Clinton, Protecting America's Wetlands: A Fair, 
Flexible and Effective Approach, 58 Fed. Reg. 47,718-722 (1994) (referring to U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers guidance letter implementing President's policy initiative that includes 
wetlands banking); Mitigation MOA, supra note 207, at 9,212; Michael G. Le Desma, Note, 
A Sound of Thunder: Problems and Prospects in Wetland Mitigation Banking, 19 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 497, 499-500 (1994); Jonathan Silverstein, Comment, Taking Wetlands to the 
Bank: The Role of Wetland Mitigation Banking in a Comprehensive Approach to Wetlands 
Protection, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 129, 132-34 (1994). 
212. See Preservation Coalition, 667 F.2d at 860, (holding that mitigation measures 
must be related to the project at issue and that general air pollution control requirements for 
automobiles did not count as mitigation for increased automobile traffic resulting from 
downtown center redevelopment project). See generally Bulson, supra note 207 (arguing 
that courts should apply a more stringent standard of review under NEPA when a agency uses 
off-site mitigation to justify a project). 
213. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1989) 
(observing that EIS discussed several off-site mitigation options); Marsh v. Oregon Natural 
Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 366-67 (1989) (noting that EIS mitigated fish loss from 
dam through off-site hatchery); Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 837-38 (9th Cir. 
1986) (upholding mitigation through off-site purchase of wetlands). 
214. See EPA, EPA Final Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 24,796 (1998); Christopher D. Carey, Negotiating Environmental Penalties: Guidance 
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The Interim Guidance states that, if it is impracticable for a 
pennittee to mitigate sufficiently the public health or environmental 
impacts of a proposal, the EPA will consider the benefits of 
"supplemental mitigation projects" (SMPs), along with project related 
mitigation efforts, in detennining whether the recipient and pennittee 
have adequately addressed the disparate impacts of a project and 
sufficiently compensated the affected community?16 The Interim 
Guidance suggests that SMPs are attractive because they can address 
"concerns associated with the pennitting of the facility raised by the 
complainant that cannot otherwise be redressed under Title VI (i.e., 
because they are outside those considerations ordinarily entertained by 
the pennitting authority).,,217 For instance, a developer that cannot 
sufficiently reduce air pollution impacts from a project might 
undertake a beneficial wetlands project. On the other hand, 
environmentalists are justifiably concerned that an unrelated 
supplemental mitigation project may not address the harms flowing 
from the project. If a supplemental project enhances biodiversity, but 
does nothing to reduce unacceptable human health effects from a 
project, then such mitigation should not count. While the guidelines 
should not prohibit all types of supplemental or off-site mitigation, the 
EPA should amend its supplemental mitigation proposal to require that 
any mitigation address similar health or environmental risks as those 
caused by the project. If toxic air pollution from a project increases 
the risk of, for instance, colon cancer, an appropriate supplemental 
project might reduce toxic water pollution that causes the same 
disease. In light of society's limited knowledge about causes and 
comparative risk of different diseases, the EPA should not allow a 
project to justify an unacceptable cancer risk, such as a one in one 
thousand increased risk of cancer, with a supplemental mitigation 
project that may reduce the incidence of an unrelated harm, such as 
neurological disease caused by lead poisoning. Furthermore, the EPA 
should be cautious about allowing pollution reductions in one 
on the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects, 44 A.F. L. Rev. 1 (1998); Leslie J. 
Kaschak, Note, Supplemental Environmental Projects: Evolution of a Policy, 2 ENVTL. LAW. 
465 (1996). 
215. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1997) (specifically authorizing supplemental 
environmental projects of up to $100,000 under Clean Air Act); Quan B. Nghiern, Comment, 
Using Equitable Discretion to Impose Supplemental Environmental Projects Under the Clean 
Water Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 561, 562 n.6 (1997) Oisting several decisions 
approving supplemental environmental project under the Clean Water Act). 
216. See EPA, INTERlM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 11-12. 
217. Id. at 12. 
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medium, such as water, substitute for increased pollution in another 
medium, such as the air.2!8 
At the very least, pennit applicants and pennitting agencies 
should have the burden of demonstrating that any proffered mitigation 
measures will actually work and will reduce any health or 
environmental impacts of a proposal to acceptable levels. Industry and 
state or local pennitting agencies would probably agree that proposed 
mitigation techniques ought to be made in good faith; it is difficult to 
argue that project sponsors and pennitting agencies should use 
mitigation measures to justify a project if they have no real intention to 
carry out such protective techniques. Industry and state or local 
pennitting agencies probably would oppose imposing sanctions if 
good faith mitigation proposals do not work as well in practice as 
predicted at the time of a pennit application. 
If it is impracticable to carry out proposed mitigation measures 
that were used to justify a project, the EPA ought to ensure that a 
pennittee and the pennitting agency take alternative steps that provide 
substantially equivalent protection, or that the pennitting agency shut 
down a project if it poses unacceptable risks. The more difficult 
question is what to do when the mitigation measures are less effective 
than predicted, but the facility is marginally safe. 
The Interim Guidance requires that the recipient determine 
whether mitigation measures can serve as "less discriminatory 
alternatives.,,219 The Interim Guidance does not explain, however, 
whether this requirement applies only to the proposed site, or also to 
potential alternative sites. The EPA should explicitly require recipients 
to examine whether such mitigation measures could also be used at 
less discriminatory alternative sites that meet the applicant's 
reasonable business needs. If a proposed site that would otherwise 
pose unacceptable risks can be made safe through the use of mitigation 
measures, it is not unreasonable to ask whether those techniques might 
make a less discriminatory alternative site that meets the applicant's 
reasonable business needs acceptable as well. As a practical matter, 
the cost of evaluating the impact of mitigation measures might justify 
218. See generally Hornstein, supra note 68, at 584-616 (arguing that comparative risk 
analysis has many limitations); Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 394-97 (same); 
Bradford C. Mank, The Environmental Protection Agency s Project XL and Other Regulatory 
Refonn Initiatives: The Need for Legislative Authorization, 25 EcoLOGY L.Q. 1, 70-73 
(1998) [hereinafter Mank, Project XL] (criticizing proposals for cross-media trading and 
emphasizing society's limited scientific knowledge about comparative harm of different 
diseases); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey 
from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 103, 189-90 (1998) (same). 
219. See EPA, lNrERlM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 12. 
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focusing on a relatively small number of potentially less 
discriminatory alternative sites. If mitigation strategies can be used to 
justifY siting a facility in a minority area, presumably the same 
techniques might make a majority area suitable for the facility. 
3. Technical Assistance Grants 
Furthermore, for environmental permitting decisions to have 
legitimacy in a democratic society, it is important that a permitting 
agency provide significant opportunities for public participation, 
rather than make decisions by administrative fiat. 220 If an agency 
simply provides opportunities for public comment, however, it may 
not reach disadvantaged groupS.221 Accordingly, the EPA should take 
affirmative steps to ensure broad participation by minority and low-
income populations by providing technical assistance to Title VI 
complainants and should also provide technical assistance grants so 
that complainants can hire their own technical experts or require 
recipients to provide them. Under its section 602 regulations, the 
EPA cannot award damages to complainants222 or provide attorneys 
fees.223 Accordingly, there is no incentive for profit-motivated 
experts or attorneys to provide technical assistance. In other areas of 
environmental law, the EPA has provided technical assistance grants 
to environmental organizations; although these grants are often too 
small and the application process is so cumbersome for the average 
community organization that they need to hire experts to apply for a 
grant to hire such experts!224 
220. See Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Risk and Democratic Process: A Critical 
Review, 14 CoLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 501, 523-30 (1989); Sheila Foster, Justicefrom the Ground 
Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the 
Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REv. 775, 831-32 (1998) [hereinafter Foster, 
Justice from the Ground Up]; Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 370; Douglas R 
Williams, Environmental Law and Democratic Legitimacy, 4 DUKE ENvrL. L. & POL'y F. 1, 
19-31 (1994). 
221. See Deeohn Ferris, Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste Cleanup: 
Expanding Public Participation in the Federal Supeifund Program, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
671, 675-77 (1994); Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 369. 
222. See 40 C.F.R § 7.130(a) (1997); Hammer, supra note 26, at 711. 
223. See North Carolina Dep't ofTransp. v. Crest St. Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 12-16 
(1986) (stating that agencies cannot award attorneys fees to complainants even if an agency 
finds a violation, but successful plaintiffs who file a private lawsuit under Title VI may 
recover attorneys fees). 
224. See Ferris, supra note 221, at 679-80; Mank, Project XL, supra note 217, at 78-
79. See generally EPA, OFFICE OF SOLID W ASfE AND EMERGENCY REsPONSE, SUPERFUND 
TEcHNICAL ASSISTANCE GRANT HANDBOOK: APPLYING FOR YOUR GRANT (1993) (EPA 540-
K-93-003) [hereinafter EPA, APPLYING FOR YOUR GRANT]; EPA, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE 
AND EMERGENCY REsPONSE, SUPERFUND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GRANT HANDBOOK: THE 
APPLICATION FORMS WITH mSTRuCI10Ns (1993) (EPA 540-K-93-004). 
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The EPA already provides grants to state, tribal, and local 
governments to help them comply with Title VI and to achieve 
environmental justice goals. In fiscal year 1998, the Office of 
Environmental Justice expected to award $500,000 under the State and 
Tribal Environmental Justice Grants Program, with a maximum of 
$100,000 per grant.225 In addition, in fiscal year 1998, the Office of 
Environmental Justice expected to award $3.5 million to local 
governments to establish pilot programs for its enhanced 
Environmental Monitoring for Public Access and Cornmunity 
Tracking (EMPACT) Grants Program that will likely include programs 
enhancing the ability of the public to identify pollution that has a 
disparate impact on minorities?26 
Section 117(e) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) ''provides for technical 
assistance grants of up to $50,000 for any group or individual affected 
by a release or threatened release at any abandoned hazardous waste 
facility that is listed on the National Priorities List under the National 
Contingency Plan.,,227 The EPA, however, has awarded relatively few 
grants under this statute, and by its own admission ''the agency has 
made it difficult for local citizens or environmental groups to win these 
grants because of unnecessary 'restrictions, complexity, costs, and red 
tape. ",228 For instance, community groups must ordinarily supply 
funds matching twenty percent of the total grant unless they obtain a 
225. See STEJ Grants Program Request for Applications Guidance FY 1998, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 13,666 (1998). The EPA also awards grants of up to $300,000 each to universities that 
form partnerships with disadvantaged communities through its Community-University 
Partnership Grants Program. See EPA, Office of Environmental Justice and the Office of 
Civil Rights Solicitation Notice for Fiscal Year (FY) 1995; Environmental Justice 
CommunitylUniversity Partnership Grants Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,281-14,282 (1995). 
226. See EPA, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE AsSURANCE, 
ENvIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND COMMUNITY TRACKING (EMPACT) GRANTS PROGRAM 
(visited Nov. 22, 1998) <http://es.epagov/oecaloej/empact.htm1>. 
227. Mank, Project XL, supra note 217, at 78; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e)(1997); 40 
C.F.R. §§ 35.4000-35.4130 (1997). It is possible to seek a waiver of the $50,000 limit for an 
initial grant, up to a $100,000 limit per site, but only if a cleanup is unusually complex. See 
40 C.F.R. § 35.4090(a)(2); EPA, OFFICE OF SOLID WA'fITE AND EMERGENCY REsPONSE, 
SUPERFUND TEcHNICAL ASSISTANCE GRANT HANDBOOK: MANAGING YOUR GRANT 11-12 
(1994) (EPA-K-93-006) [hereinafter EPA, MANAGING YOUR GRANT]. 
228. Mank, Project XL, supra note 217, at 78 (quoting 1989 Superfund Mgmt. Rev. at 
5-16); accord 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAzARDous WA'fITES & 
SUBSTANCES § 8.9.C.3, 617-18 n.133 (1992) (same); see also Ellison Folk, Public 
Participation in the Superfund Cleanup Process, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 173, 199 n.175 (1991) 
(discussing restrictions on TAG grants); James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Benefits 
and Costs of Regulatory Reforms for Superfund, 16 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 159, 180 (1997) 
("[O]our research indicates that minority communities are much less likely to receive 
[Superfund technical assistance] grants than other communities.") (footnote omitted). 
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waiver.229 In addition, community organizations must meet a number 
of administrative requirements, including being an incorporated 
nonprofit organization, and file quarterly progress reports and yearly 
financial reports.230 The agency evaluates grant applications based on 
a five criteria, weighted one hundred point scoring system, that 
includes: (1) the site's risk (thirty points), (2) the applicant's ability to 
represent the public (twenty points), (3) how the group plans to use its 
proposed technical advisor (twenty points), (4) the ability of the 
applicant to inform the public (twenty points), and (5) the economic or 
environmental threat the site poses to group members (ten pointS).231 
The agency does not give a lump sum grant to successful applicants, 
but instead reimburses them for their actual expenses.232 
The EPA has also proposed to provide up to $25,000 per project 
for technical assistance to stakeholders involved in its Project XL 
regulatory reform program.233 These grants must be paid directly to 
the expert for specified assistance and may not be paid to individuals 
or groups of stakeholders.234 The EPA's Project XL technical 
assistance grant proposal offers inadequate grants and unduly restricts 
in not alloWing community organizations to hire their own experts to 
examine the safety of industry projects that propose to modify existing 
environmental regulations to achieve greater efficiency.235 
There are special reasons for providing technical assistance to 
Title VI complainants because of the complexities of demonstrating 
disparate impacts. These complexities include defining the relevant 
area and "affected populations," the appropriate facilities, and the 
amount and harmfulness of pollution involves complex scientific 
229 .. See 40 c.F.R. §§ 35.4085(a) (1997) (mandating 20% matching fund 
requirement); id .. § 35.4090(b) (setting forth waiver provision); EPA, APPLYING FOR YOUR 
GRANT, supra note 224, at 4-5. 
230. See 40 C.F.R § 35.4020(b)(1997) (requiring that TAG recipient be incorporated 
nonprofit organization); id. § 35.4110(a)-(b) (requiring quarterly progress and yearly financial 
reports); EPA, APPLYING FOR YOUR GRANT, supra note 224, at 3-4 (requiring applicant to be 
incorporated); EPA, MANAGING YOUR GRANT, supra note 229, at 7-8 (discussing quarterly 
and annual report requirements). 
231. See id. § 35.4035(a)-(5) (listing five criteria); Mank, Project XL, supra note 217, 
at 78-79. 
232. See 40 c.F.R. § 35.4080; Mank, Project XL, supra note 217, at 79. 
. 233. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,872, 19,881 
(1997); Mank, Project XL, supra note 217, at 68, 77-79 (criticizing EPA proposal for 
technical assistance grants for Project XL as inadequate). 
234. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. at 19,881; Mank, 
Project XL, supra note 217, at 68, 77-79. 
235. See Mank,ProjectXL, supra note 217, at 68, 77-79. 
HeinOnline -- 73 Tul. L. Rev. 837 1998-1999
1999] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND TITLE VI 837 
judgments?36 Therefore, the pennittee, the complainant, and the 
recipient permitting agency will want their own experts to present their 
side of how to interpret the facts of a case to EPA officials. 
Even if the EPA's final Title VI interim guidance provides better 
definitions than the Interim Guidance, it is important for all 
participants in a Title VI environmental justice case to have access to 
experts who can discuss with the agency different possible 
interpretations of demographic and pollution data. While state or local 
pennitting agencies and permit applicants may find it burdensome to 
employ the necessary experts in a Title VI case, the hardship on 
environmental justice complainants is likely to be even greater. 
Although a simple letter is sufficient to file a Title VI complaint with 
the EPA, a complainant may need technical experts to review the 
agency's proposed findings about demographic and pollution data. 
In the controversial Shintech case, which involved a proposal to 
build a plastics factory in the heavily polluted and minority 
community of Convent, Louisiana, the EPA struggled to define which 
facilities and population groups should have been included in its 
disparate impact analysis.237 The Louisiana environmental agency that 
was the target of the Title VI complaint argued that the EPA should 
have just studied the emissions resulting from the proposed Shintech 
permit under challenge.238 According to the permit applicant, the 
complainants, and the EPA itself, the census and pollution data used 
by the agency in a draft report examining the Shin tech proposal 
contained significant errors, onnsslOns, and uncertainties.239 
Furthermore, the agency could have reached a different result if it 
examined population and pollution data from a one-mile radius around 
the proposed site rather than a four-mile radius. Evaluating the risk of 
a facility to surrounding populations was very difficult because 
236. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 9-11; supra note 132 and 
accompanying text. 
237. See Hogue, Consider Only EmissiOns, supra note 128, at A-3 (discussing 
comments of Bliss Higgins of the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality). 
Shintech just announced that it has abandoned the Convent site, but is proposing to build a 
smaller facility in nearby Plaquemine. See Traci Watson, La. Town Successful in Stopping 
Plastics Plant, USA TODAY, Sept. 18, 1998, at 7A. The EPA is suspending its investigation 
into the plant's impact, and may also suspend its Title VI investigation into Louisiana DEQ. 
Seeid. 
238. See note 237 and accompanying text. 
239. See Bruce Alpert, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 15, 1998, at Al (reporting that the EPA 
found census data within one mile of proposed Shintech facility to be unreliable, and also had 
difficulty measuring amount of pollution in four-mile area); Vicki Ferstel, Data for EPA s 
Shin tech Decision Confusing at Best, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La), July 2, 1998, at 1B 
(reporting that Shintech found that fewer people lived within one mile of site than EPA data 
claimed). 
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different assumptions about the size of the area that was "most 
affected" and the hatmfulness of the pollutants can lead to 
dramatically different results.240 
Because complainants often cannot afford to hire necessary 
technical experts, the EPA ought to provide meaningful technical 
assistance grants, perhaps up to $100,000 per complaint, to allow 
complainants to thoroughly investigate a complainant once the EPA 
concludes after a preliminary investigation that the complaillt raises 
serious health issues. The primary problem with this proposal is 
:finding the necessary funding. Ideally, the pennittee should pay to 
provide the complainant with expert assistance. Pennittees, however, 
would likely object to funding their opponents. The EPA could require 
that recipients provide funding, but the agency might have to increase 
its funding to recipients to enable them to provide such grants. As a 
practical matter, the EPA will probably have to provide funding for 
technical assistance grants. The political opposition to the Interim 
Guidance, however, suggests that there may be substantial opposition 
to any proposal that makes it easier for environmental justice groups to 
file Title VI complaints that can stymie proposed industrial projects. 
To overcome this opposition, it may be necessary to tie technical 
assistance grants to proposals for more collaboration among industry, 
recipients and the public?41 
It would be better policy to allow the complainant to hire its own 
expert so it has the flexibility to pursue various possible leads, rather 
than adopt the EPA's Project XL requirement that the agency directly 
pay the expert for narrowly tailored assistance. However, the latter 
option would be better than no assistance at all. It is often hard to 
predict in advance exactly what type of technical assistance is 
available to investigate a complex case such as Shintech. Accordingly, 
240. See generally Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 343 n.59, 390-92 & 
n.373 (discussing how use of different definitions of subpopulations or geographical areas 
can dramatically affect research results); Mohai, supra note 11, at 615 (same); Zimmerman, 
supra note 11, at 665-69 (same). 
241. See supra Part Y.BA. Industry and state or local officials would likely strongly 
oppose EPA giving grants to Title VI complainants. In September 1998, the Detroit News 
criticized the EPA for providing a $5,000 grant to a local community group, Flint-Genese 
United for Action, because a closely associated group, St Francis Prayer Center, later filed a 
Title VI complaint against a proposed steel plant in Flint, Michigan. EPA argued that the 
grant was for development of a community demographic and pollution profile and did not 
pay for the group to file the complaint See David Mastio, EPA Aided Mill Workers: Flint 
Prayer Center Affiliated Gets $5,000 from Agency to Lobby Local Officials, DETROIT NEWS, 
Sept. 23, 1998, at AI; EPA: Rogue Agency, DETROIT NEWS, Sept 24, 1998, at A8 (reporting 
editorial criticizing EPA's actions). But see Letters: EPA Denies Bankrolling Flint 
Complaint, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 8, 1998, at D8 (printing a Letter to the Editor by David A. 
Ullrich, Acting Administrator, U.S. EPA Region V). 
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direct grants to complainants would allow them more freedom to 
select their experts and lines of inquiry. 
Understandably, the EPA is nervous that a community 
organization might misuse or waste a grant, and thus prefers a more 
rigidly bureaucratic program where it closely monitors the exact work 
that an expert performs. Even the EPA has recognized, however, that 
its CERCLA TAG program has imposed too many complex rules on 
applicants who lack the resources and technical sophistication to 
anticipate every issue. Community groups should not need to hire an 
expert to prepare a grant request for technical assistance. 
The EPA must strike a balance between making sure technical 
assistance grants are not wasted and using them to help community 
organizations participate more effectively in challenging projects that a 
preliminary investigation suggests are likely to cause disparate impacts 
to minority and ethnic groups protected by Title VI. The EPA needs to 
provide grants that are large enough to level the playing field to some 
extent, so that community groups can challenge industry experts. 
However, it is unlikely that community groups will even come close to 
matching the resources of industry. In addition, the EPA needs to 
allow enough flexibility in its TAG program to allow experts to pursue 
promising areas of inquiry if significant new evidence emerges. In 
theory, a group could submit a revised application to investigate 
additional areas, but it is very cumbersome for grant applicants to file a 
revised application every time new information suggests a slightly 
different avenue of investigation. Instead, the EPA should provide 
lump sum grants to qualified experts to pursue evidence that is 
reasonably relevant to an ongoing Title VI investigation. 
There are several ways the EPA can ensure that TAG funds are 
not misused without adopting unduly restrictive rules. First, the EPA 
could provide such grants only if its preliminary investigation found 
probable cause that a violation has occurred. Second, the EPA could 
require that any expert must take an agency training course and be 
certified by the agency or another state or national accreditation board. 
Third, the EPA could monitor the use of these funds. Fourth, the EPA 
could require that it directly pay the expert and even choose the expert, 
although that may reduce the complainant's freedom to investigate 
promising leads. A technical assistance program for Title VI 
complainants would allow them to bring effective challenges against 
the permittee and recipient agency, which usually have far greater 
resources. 
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4. Providing the Public with a Reasonable Opportunity to Raise 
Issues of Disparate Impacts 
A recipient agency's pennitting process should provide the 
public with a reasonable opportunity to raise claims of disparate 
impacts. It could be argued that it is sufficient that the public may 
file Title VI administrative complaints with the EPA even if the 
recipient agency has no internal provisions for addressing disparate 
impacts challenges. The EPA, however, has promulgated regulations 
under section 602 of Title VI that prohibit recipient agencies from 
engaging in practices creating discriminatory effects or locating a 
facility where it will have discriminatory effects, including state 
agencies granting environmental pennits.242 Furthermore, the EPA 
regulations mandate that state recipients maintain Title VI 
compliance programs addressing both discrimination by the state and 
by any beneficiaries of state-administered funds.243 If a state or local 
recipient does not take at least some steps to provide the public with 
a reasonable opportunity t~ raise claims of disparate impacts, the 
recipient is arguably in violation of these provisions. 
Both recipients and the,EPA have an interest in minimizing the 
number of Title VI claims, becaUse the investigation of such 
complaints is costly, time consuming, and often contentious. Several 
state officials have testified before Congress that they would prefer to 
resolve discrimination issues before minority individuals or groups file 
Title VI complaints.z44 The EPA has recognized that reducing the 
number of Title VI complaints is an important goal, and has 
specifically asked the' agency's advisory committee on implementing 
Title VI to recommend changes in state or local pennitting practices to 
resolve problems befo:re they become the subject of complaints.z45 
242. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1997) (prohibiting use of discriminatory program 
criteria); id. § 7.35.( c) (prohibiting location offacility that has discriminatory effect). 
243. See 28 c.F.R. § 42.410 (1998). 
244. See Hogue, Permits Have Remained Valid, supra note 44, at A-9. 
245. See Environmental Justice: New EPA Advisory Committee to Address Rights 
Concerns on State, Local Permitting, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2441 (1998); Pollution in 
Minority and Inner-City Neighborhoods: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigations, 105th Cong., (Aug. 6, 1998), available in 1998 WL 12763021 
(testimony of Michael Hogan, New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, stating that 
New Jersey is adopting "an inclusive collaborative process to address issues of environmental 
equity" and an "upfrontlproactive environmental equity process" that allows local minority 
and low-income communities to have "input into the permitting process when it is most 
meaningful, before the permit is issued"); Pollution in Minority and Inner-City 
Neighborhoods: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 
105th Cong., (Aug. 6, 1998), available in 1998 WL 12763097 (testimony of Barry McBee, 
Chairman of Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission) (noting that Texas seeks to 
provide citizens with opportunity for early, meaningful input into permitting process). 
HeinOnline -- 73 Tul. L. Rev. 841 1998-1999
1999] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND TITLE VI 841 
A recipient is much more likely to avoid Title VI complaints if it 
requires community involvement and public participation early in the 
permitting process?46 New Jersey and Texas state officials have 
testified before Congress that they have already created ''three-legged'' 
networks of government, business and minority communities to 
discuss the racial implications of siting decisions, and that they want to 
further develop these ''up-fronf' processes to avoid discrimination 
problems?47 These state officials want the EPA to approve such pre-
licensing procedures so there would be a shield, or at least a 
presumption, that any Title VI complaint lacked substance if the state 
follows the approved process, rather than have the EPA conduct 
lengthy post-licensing reviews, as in the Shintech case?48 The 
Environmental Council of States, representing forty-nine states and the 
District of Columbia, has created a working group to develop such 
principles, and the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection has similar plans?49 The more a recipient's permitting 
process parallels the EPNs Title VI criteria, the more likely a recipient 
will avoid engaging in discrimination that violates the EPNs section 
602 regulations. 
Even if a state develops procedures to encourage public 
participation in the permitting process, there may still be serious 
questions about whether that process adequately addresses those most 
at risk, particularly vulnerable minority groups. Existing processes for 
creating community advisory boards for siting or permitting decisions 
often fail to guarantee that those at greatest risk will have 
representation?50 There are possible solutions, such as granting more 
votes to those at greater risk, adopting cumulative or proportional 
voting schemes that allow all minority voters to cumulate their votes, 
or ranking candidates in preference to increase the odds of minority 
246. See Hogue, Pennits Have Remained Valid, supra note 44, at A-9. 
247. See id. at A-9; Joan McKinney, Congressmen Want New Siting Rules, ADVOCATE 
(Baton Rouge, La), Aug. 9,1998, at 17B. 
248. See Hogue, Pennits Have Remained Valid, supra note 44, at A-9; McKinney, 
supra note 247, at 17B. 
249. See Hogue, Pennits Have Remained Valid, supra note 44, at A-9. The 
Environmental Council of States has drafted an envirorupental justice principles paper which 
it will submit to state officials for a vote in October, 1998. See State Officials Draft New 
Alternatives to EPA Environmental Justice Policy, ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, Aug. 26, 1998, at 
30. 
250. See Foster, Justicefrom the Ground Up, supra note 220, at 834-37 (arguing that 
citizen advisory committees may not adequately represent minorities); Mank, Environmental 
Justice, supra note 9, at 410-19 (arguing that community siting compensation committees 
may not adequately represent minorities or high-risk residents). 
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representation.251 The EPA or the recipient could use technical 
assistance grants to educate minority or high-risk residents about a 
project and, accordingly, increase the odds that members of such 
groups will participate. Several federal agencies in their 
environmental justice strategies have established programs to educate 
the public, to reach minority groups that may not traditionally 
participate in agency permitting decisions, to translate documents in 
languages other than English where appropriate, and to write their 
environmental documents in plain language that is accessible to the 
general public.252 The EPA should strongly encourage recipients to 
adopt similar programs. 
If a state adopts effective and meaningful procedures 
encouraging early participation, the EPA should take such 
participation into account when reviewing a Title VI complaint. If a 
complainant participated in such a process, but did not raise an issue or 
present an alternative at that time, the complainant has a weaker claim 
that the recipient acted unreasonably. To insure effective participation, 
however, the EPA or recipients should provide technical assistance, 
and hopefully TAG grants, to community organizations early in the 
permitting process to identify problems before significant resources 
are invested in a site. In particular, any state process should examine 
whether less discriminatory alternatives exist. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The EPA's regulations provide few rights for complainants, but 
many protections to recipients that the agency finds have engaged in 
discriminatory practices. Also, there are substantial differences 
between Title VI's regulation of recipients who voluntarily accept 
federal aid and Title VII's prohibition of discriminatory actions by 
private employers. Accordingly, the EPA should not follow the 
burden of proof or affinnative defenses that apply to employment 
discrimination issues. Because recipients generally posses greater 
expertise and resources than complainants, it is appropriate to place a 
greater burden on recipients to justify their permit decisions. 
Recipients should bear the burden of establishing that no less 
discriminatory alternatives exist that can meet the applicant's 
251. See ManIc, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 412-14 (proposing cumulative 
voting or Hare Single Transferable Vote proportional voting systems as ways to increase 
representation of minorities or high-risk residents on community siting compensation 
committees). 
252. See Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-200-R-95-002, ENvIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE STRATEGY (1995); Mank, Executive Order 12,898, supra note 22. 
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legitimate objectives, that they will actually. implement proposed 
mitigation measures, and that no mitigation techniques exist that 
would allow a less discriminatory alternative to satisfy the 
applicant's genuine goals. Furthennore, the EPA or recipients should 
level the playing field by providing technical assistance and grants to 
Title VI complainants. Finally, recipients should adopt procedures 
encouraging early participation by affected populations, particularly 
minority groups, to avoid controversies that lead to Title VI 
challenges. If a recipient has effective procedures for public 
participation by a diverse group of citizens and provides reasonable 
technical assistance to such groups, the EPA should usually defer to 
its pennitting decisions. 
With these changes, state and local pennitting agencies and 
pennit applicants will finally have a strong incentive to avoid locating 
polluting facilities in minority areas if reasonably effective less 
discriminatory alternatives exist. These changes, however, should not 
discourage legitimate development projects that add significant 
economic value to minority communities. The proposed changes 
strike a reasonable balance between preventing disparate impacts that 
unduly hann minority communities and allowing development in 
impoverished minority areas. Developers can use effective mitigation 
measures and the promise of significant economic benefits to win 
approval for beneficial economic development projects in minority 
areas. 
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